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ABSTRACT 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY IN THE REALM OF THE COMMON 
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
 
 
Barın Kayaoğlu 
M.A., Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Prof. Ergun Özbudun 
September 2002 
 
This thesis analyzes the European Union’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and 
Turkey’s relation with the EU in this respect. It is argued that the European Union has come a 
long way from being a mere trade club to an economic and political fulcrum. It started as a 
mere administrative body to oversee the common market on steel and coal, and in less than 
half a century has become a complicated network where the members have pooled significant 
portions of their sovereignty in order to reap the common benefits of that pool. In this respect, 
the European Union is in motion towards establishing a common foreign and security policy 
and it is the outcome of this motion that is going to determine the EU’s political significance 
in the following years. Moreover, Turkey’s EU journey can be looked at from a much 
unattended CFSP perspective; is Turkey’s prospects for membership strengthened by 
Turkey’s strategic importance or is Turkey’s volatile proximity a handicap?  
 
 
 
Key Words: European integration, European Union, common foreign and security policy,  
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ÖZET 
 
ORTAK DIŞ VE GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI ALANINDA  
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ VE TÜRKİYE 
 
 
Barın Kayaoğlu 
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Ergun Özbudun 
Eylül 2002 
 
Bu çalışma Avrupa Birliği’nin Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası’nı (ODGP) incelerken 
Türkiye’nin AB’yle olan ilişkisine ODGP açısından bakmaktadır. Burada Avrupa Birliği’nin 
basit bir ticaret örgütünden iktisadi ve siyasi bir ağırlık merkezi haline gelerek çok yol kat 
ettiği savunulmaktadır. Çelik ve kömür piyasasını denetleyen bir kişilik olarak başlayıp yarım 
yüzyıldan az bir sürede üyelerinin ortak çıkarları için egemenliklerinin önemli bir kısmını 
devrettikleri karmaşık bir şebeke haline gelmiştir. Bu sebeple, Avrupa Birliği bir Ortak Dış ve 
Güvenlik Politikası oluşturma yolundadır ve AB’nin ilerki yıllarda siyasi önemini tayin 
edecek olan bu yoldur. Bunun ötesinde, Türkiye’nin AB yolculuğuna da pek dikkat edilmeyen 
ODGP boyutundan bakılabilir; Türkiye’nin üye olma ihtimaline stratejik önemi katkı mı 
sağlamaktadır yoksa etrafındaki istikrarsız bölgeler engel mi olmaktadır?  
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa entegrasyonu, Avrupa Birliği, Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explain European integration as a process and how the European 
Union emerged as an international actor, from the modest task of the ECSC to creating a 
common foreign and security policy (CFSP). In this respect, it will be argued that the EU 
experience is irreversible because it has come too far for any of its members to wish to 
separate from the process of integration. The EU’s CFSP, or second pillar, is important in this 
consideration because forging a CFSP depicts the peak of the integration, indeed the union, of 
territorially divided states. Once fusion in such an area occurs, a union in Europe will become 
impossible to ignore even by those who are most skeptical to European integration. A much 
debated question in Turkey, from where the author of this thesis comes from, is the possibility 
of the country’s future as an EU member. Owing both to his Turkish background, as well as 
Turkey’s underestimated importance for the EU and its CFSP, the author shall devote a 
chapter to Turkish prospects for EU membership and what sort of a challenge or contributor 
the CFSP poses to that avail. As Turkey is not adequately covered in the literature on the EU 
in general and on the CFSP in particular, it is hoped that bringing Turkey back in will be 
helpful to understand Turkey and its relations with the EU, especially in the CFSP dimension.  
 
The first chapter looks at the theoretical debate behind the question of European integration 
and the evolution of European integration. The question behind the first chapter is where has 
the European Union come from and where it is heading. Here, the different paradigms’ 
explanation of integration and their reflections on the EU shall be referred to. It is particularly 
the neofunctionalist school that will be emphasized because of its compatibility with 
understanding European integration; integration evolves in a step-by-step manner – when 
success is attained at one stage, integration proceeds to the next, and shall only do so 
depending on success in the steps; the renowned spillover concept. Further on, the EU’s 
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emergence in the post-Cold War era with new dimensions shall be touched upon, such as 
monetary union and the harmonization of justice and home affairs, and of course the crafting 
of a common foreign and security policy. 
 
Throughout the Cold War, Europe was being protected by the United States against the Soviet 
Union. With the insecurities of the brave new world of the post-Cold War era, new risks have 
emerged for the EU, which it has not handled successfully so far. On the other hand, the EU is 
not complacent with its short-comings in addressing the security needs of Europe; that is the 
prime motive for the EU to forge a CFSP. Accordingly, the second chapter is going to 
describe the evolution of the EU’s CFSP in the light of Europe’s security and defense needs 
after the Second World War. The chapter will trace the origins of the emergence of a 
European approach to the security needs of Europe, different than those of the United States, 
to the Cold War. The events that followed with the end of the Cold War have inescapably 
influenced the European Union to create a new European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI) with the US, and a CFSP for itself, in order to address the security and defense needs 
of the continent. In this respect, the chapter will also analyze how the transformation from 
NATO to ESDI and CFSP is underway. On the other hand, other important factors, such as 
the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Gulf War, have influenced the new security outlook of 
Europe, and these will be touched upon. As with everything for the past one year, the 
September 11th terror attacks are to significantly alter perceptions of security; terrorism will 
be accredited with more attention and this will have repercussions for the EU as well. From 
then on, emphasis will be made on the outcome of the ESDI (which now became the ESDP – 
replace “Identity” with “Policy”), and the CFSP; the creation of a European army by the end 
of 2003 and how all of these events are going to affect international relations. 
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The third chapter talks about the EU and Turkey in the realm of the second pillar. For over a 
decade, Turkey’s accession to the EU has been a subject of great debate. Different 
considerations are made when thinking of Turkey’s accession to the EU. One problem 
regarding Turkey’s exclusion from the EU today is about its inclusion to Europe throughout 
the Cold War; because Turkey was not a Communist country, its European identity was not 
questioned by the Europeans during the Cold War. Today, there are serious doubts how 
European Turkey is, and it can be said that this doubt is one reason why Turkey’s EU 
membership is progressing remarkably slowly. Turkey’s accession to the EU also connotes 
several other points: how reasonable is it to exclude Turkey from the EU when it can be such 
an invaluable asset to the forging of the CFSP? In this respect, the third chapter is going to 
analyze the prospects for convergence between the two parties, especially in the realm of the 
second pillar because an alternative option may not be feasible for either of the parties. 
However, there does exist serious divides between the two parties, particularly regarding 
Turkey’s security priorities and this can pose a setback for the suggested convergence. 
 
In the conclusion, the thesis will be summed up and the importance of the CFSP for the EU 
and the future of international affairs shall be accounted for. For one thing, European 
integration’s direction depends on the success of the creation of a workable CFSP for the EU. 
It can only be through a CFSP that the EU can act harmoniously in matters relating to the 
security of its members. In this manner, the question of the CFSP delivers a new dimension to 
Turkey’s move towards the EU. Turkey must be prudent to bear in mind the fact that the 
European Union is not the same trade club that it dealt with during the Cold War. Finally, it 
has to be said that the transformation of the EU in the way that the thesis discusses will have 
repercussions for the United States’ modus operandi in the international scene; the CFSP may 
give the Europeans an equal say in the international scene. 
 4 
CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
This chapter examines and endeavors to lay the foundations of the thesis by setting the 
theoretical background regarding the European Union and the history of European 
integration. The history-telling part is as important as the theoretical focus because 
academic work usually lacks a hindsight perspective on the EU, which obscures the 
average reader who is elsewhere immediately exposed to the theoretical side. 
 
When analyzing the evolution of European integration, one can immediately trace a trend: 
European integration took off with modest tasks and as it entered a new area of 
development then it deepened the realm in which it cooperated. It did not create grandiose 
sets of laws, procedures, and institutions but cooperative bodies where Europeans saw 
common interests; federal structures were allowed to flourish if the results of cooperation 
succeeded. To exemplify, the European integration scrutinized in this thesis did not start 
off by the creation of an organization in charge of many tasks, with clear duties for its 
members. The Council of Europe, which was set up in May 1949 to realize a great ideal; a 
Europe where democracy and human rights are upheld. For one thing, the Council of 
Europe was not the motor of democracy and human rights; countries that were 
disrespectful to those principles existed even within the Council of Europe and did not feel 
bound by its principles. Underestimating the role of this organization as it may, the inertial 
nature of the Council of Europe cannot be doubted. Even though it does have various 
sanctions for its non-complying members, it remains largely neglected. The EU, on the 
other hand, had started off with cooperation in a minor, but important field of industry, 
thereafter spreading and enhancing its role to areas greater in scope. The idea that 
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recommended countries to cooperate over modest goals, then deepening their cooperation 
was triggered by David Mitrany with his  article, A Working Peace System (1943). His 
functionalist approach suggested – not particularly for Europe but for the whole world – an 
international system after the Second World War where states were to cooperate over areas 
where their common interests lay (Mitrany, 1966). Mitrany argued that the League of 
Nations arrangement failed primarily because there was no material contact, i.e. economic 
cooperation, between its members, hence, nothing for them to lose when they left the 
League. To remedy this, he went on, international affairs had to be based on cooperation 
on fields were there was a need to solve the common problems of the world. The 
functionalist approach did not recommend immediate integration; it was to come later, if 
success in the cooperation was attained. As it will be explained, this functionalist approach 
lay at the heart of European integration and brought it well in to the 21st century. 
 
Also, a great length has been written as to the form of European integration. Some have 
referred to it as an essentially intergovernmental process, suggesting that it is but a mere 
international organization created through the reason of the member countries. Others have 
argued that European integration has emerged as a supranational concept, exerting itself on 
the member countries as a post-Westphalian political entity, that is, something beyond the 
modern nation-state (Karatekelioğlu, 2000). 
 
Another important question regarding European integration looks at where it is heading, as 
well as what it is currently. This question scrutinizes the form the EU takes, in other words, 
its material existence. Is Europe really heading towards the federal union that its founding 
fathers, such as Jean Monnet and Altiero Spinelli envisaged? Or is there more of an 
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element of diluted confederalism? Is it possible that the academic community confines 
itself to the federal-confederal axis while overlooking another explanation. This question 
shall be addressed further in the chapter, as well as other fruitful ones.  
 
1.1 Theoretical Background to European Integration 
What is the merit of having a united/integrated Europe? How and why do countries with 
different traditions and experiences, as well as bitter memories for one another, constitute a 
union. What is the nature of their integration, and after all, how and for what do countries 
endeavor to integrate?  
 
1.1.1 Transactionalism and Security Communities 
This approach can also be termed the psychological approach because of its perceptions of 
the attributes to community. Led by Karl Deutsch, the transactionalist school advocates the 
idea that different political units come together because they have a common security 
interest for doing so (Deutsch, 1957). These political units, be it states or tribes, form what 
the transactionalist school calls security communities, where the use of war as a solution to 
their problems is eradicated. 
 
Formed by states coming together for mutual security, security communities aim to 
enhance cooperation and other linkages between the societies within the community in 
question. Security communities are of two type; amalgamated and pluralistic. 
Amalgamated security communities are defined as those communities that formally fuse 
together through some form of an institutions. Pluralistic security communities, on the 
other hand, are described as the convergence of political entities while retaining their 
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distinct characteristics1. Further on, the transactionalist hypothesis is that the sense of 
community among states is a function of communication between states, that is, 
communities become more integrated to the extend of their contact with each other. 
 
The transactionalist school has traditionally been more concerned with the question of 
“why” rather than “how” when problematizing integration. Transactionalism focused more 
on the sociological aspect of integration2. The assumption is that integration, which was 
initiated at the beginning for the need of security, can progress if it continues to address 
those needs of its constituents on the one hand, and create multidimensional patterns of 
transaction amongst its people on the other. Thus, it is more of a sociological quest than an 
institutional engineering, unlike the following paradigms which look at integration from an 
institutional perspective. 
 
European integration can be well understood from the transactionalist perspective: nations 
of Western Europe came together in order not to fight amongst each other and to increase 
their collective security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Hence, it was their common concern 
for their security which brought them together. Moreover, as integration can be 
consolidated through the establishment of patterns of communication by the people who 
form that integration, European integration can be said to have consolidated, indeed 
reached the point of irreversibility because Europeans themselves find a good deal of 
reason to remain integrated and thus support the idea of the European Union. 
 
  
                                                          
1 Rosamond, Ben. 2000. Theories of European Integration. New York: St.Martin’s Press, p. 48 
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1.1.2 The European Union As a Polity: Federalism/Confederalism/Consociationalism 
One of the theories of European integration can be termed as federalism. More than a 
theory, federalism has been a political project to create a federation in Europe to replace 
the states, similar to the federative system in the United States. In this respect, there is a 
difference between federalism and federation; the latter is a form of government while the 
former is a project. Altiero Spinelli, the most appropriate figure to be described as a 
federalist stated that 
(Federalists) plan to form a small nuclei of nonconformists seeking to point out that the 
national states have lost their proper rights since they cannot guarantee the political and 
economic safety of their citizens. They also insist that European union should be brought 
about by the European populations, and not by diplomats, by directly electing a European 
constituent assembly, and by the approval through a referendum, of the constitutions that 
this assembly would prepare (Spinelli, 1972:68). 
 
As it can be seen, the aim of the federalists was to replace the system of states with that of 
a federation as soon as possible, particularly to avoid war3. They considered the greatest 
danger to Europe after the Second World War to be what can be termed a reactionary 
return of power-mongers. It was these power-mongers who had been the main cause of war 
in Europe and in order to preemptively avoid any future wars in Europe, a federally united 
Europe had to be created. 
 
Federal arrangements involve a division of authority between two levels of the polity; 
central and local. Federal systems are usually understood as resting on historic 
compromises involving the permanent compact between territorial units4. These territorial 
units concede their authority to the center while retaining their presence as a separate 
                                                                                                                                                                                
2 ibid. p.44 
3 Nelsen, Brent F. and Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.) 1994. The European Union. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, p.3 
 
4 Rosamond, Ben. 2000. Theories of European Integration. New York: St.Martin’s Press, p.24 
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entity. For example, the center is usually in charge of inter-state trade, foreign affairs and 
national defense, while the localities will be in charge of criminal law and education. 
Moreover, there does not have to be a full division between the two – cooperation over 
authority is quite possible. In order to sustain a federal arrangement, there has to be a 
constitutional structure to guarantee the federation’s viability and functionality. 
 
When questioning Europe, federalist thinking does respond with some useful answers. 
Structurally speaking, there does exist a center and a local, although the transfer of 
authority in many fields have not occurred, and is seemingly not going to occur soon. 
While the European Commission and the European Court of Justice both have 
characteristics similar to those of the US federal government and Supreme Court, both 
European institutions are highly under the spell of its constituents. The EU spins around at 
the discretion of the Council of Ministers and the European Council; it is these two 
institutions which give the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice 
the space in which they operate. For this reason, the federalist aim to create federal Europe 
still remains a noble ideal and is quite inadequate in explaining the European Union.  
 
The deficiencies of the federalist approach lead us to the question of a confederation. Can 
the European Union be labeled as a confederation; a system of government where two or 
more distinct political units preserve their separate identity but hand specified powers to a 
higher authority for reasons of convenience, mutual security, or efficiency5? In a 
confederal system, the central authority exists only at the discretion of the local units and 
its scope is bounded by the local units. Unlike in the federal system, the confederal center 
operates at the mercy of the localities and may cease to exist if the localities think that 
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would be more fit6.  The EU is similar to a confederation in two respects; first, the 
members have kept their distinct identity and second, they have the upper hand against the 
central authority. A policy can only be initiated after it has been confirmed by the 
members; neither the Commission nor the Parliament can override the authority of the 
members.  
 
There is a third way to interpret the EU and that is a term called consociationalism7. A 
consociational system of government works through reserved domains for the constituents 
in terms of their relative power. In the light of this, Lebanon is a consociational system. 
Offices are reserved for certain sects in accordance with their numerical proportion within 
the population. For example, the Lebanese president can only be a Maronite Christian 
while the office of the prime minister is reserved for a Sunni Muslim. Arend Lijphart states 
four preconditions for consociationalism8: First, there must be several groups of insulated 
people who are inwardly looking for their interests, but second, are also willing to work 
together for their common good. Third, while all retain a veto, decisions are formed based 
on consensus. Fourth, the different groups ought to be represented proportionally while a 
protection from the tyranny of a majority has to be secured. 
 
Many of the literature of consociations do not take Europe into its range of study. 
However,  right when European integration was initiated with the European Coal and Steel 
Community in the 1950’s, votes in the decision-making organs were based on the 
population of the member countries. The idea remains much the same within the EU today. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
5 ibid. p.148 
6 The experience of Yugoslavia perfectly depicted this point. 
7 For further information about consociationalism, please refer to McCormick, 1996: 91-92  
8 ibid. 91-92 
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Votes in the Council of Ministers and the Parliament are divided with greater amount of 
votes for more populous countries, such as Germany and France, in contrast to less votes 
for less populous countries, such as Denmark and Portugal. In this respect, the EU as a 
polity must not be problematized only in terms of being a federation or a confederation, but 
in terms of being a consociation where the members affect decision in accordance with 
their relative power within the system. 
   
1.1.3 The Functionalist/Neofunctionalist Approach 
As it was stated at the beginning of the chapter, at the heart of European integration in the 
post-Second World War era lay the ideas of David Mitrany. Even though David Mitrany 
was not the first intellectual who problematized peace, for example Kant wrote in 
extensive volumes on how to attain peace, it was Mitrany’s conceptualization of peace that 
seems to be applicable. In this respect, his functionalist approach, which aimed to create a 
peace system that can be put into practice, can be attributed to be one of the natural 
constituents of European integration. 
 
In his acclaimed article, A Working Peace System, Mitrany attributed the inter-war 
international system’s failure to provide for peace and security to several reasons; first, the 
never-ending competition between countries was not replaced with what he deemed as the 
needs of the people, in other words, areas of cooperation where common benefits were 
laden for all countries. Mitrany argued further that cooperation and not 
constitutionalization has to be the mode of operation of the 20th century. Henceforth, the 
League of Nations arrangement was not constructed in line with the realities of the 20th 
century, but with those of the 19th century:  
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...the Covenant of the League is seen to have continued that 19th century tradition. It was 
concerned above all with fixing in a definite way the formal relationship of the member 
states and in a measure also of non-members, and in a very secondary way with initiating 
positive common activities and action (Mitrany, 1966: 94-95). 
 
Mitrany’s perspective, accordingly, suggested the opposite: a pragmatic and technocratic 
approach in establishing a new system of international affairs. Only by creating pragmatic 
patterns of cooperation can the nations of the world see point in maintaining peace 
amongst themselves. It was the merits of this cooperation that can only stimulate nations to 
advance to greater integration. Once such a practical system was up and running, then 
could there be establishing rules and regulations for its continuity.  
 
However, one point with Mitrany’s work has to be carefully dealt with when writing about 
European integration; he disfavored the idea of regional cooperation that leads to regional 
integration for several reasons: First of all, regional integration, he foresaw, had to involve 
some measure of hierarchy, but the creation of a hierarchy was a premature idea – he 
thought this had brought the collapse of the League of Nations. More importantly, in 
creating regional cooperation, adherent countries would unavoidably create insiders and 
outsiders to integration. As a result, those opting for membership and not attaining it would 
be alienated and even turned hostile to the integration. Peaceful integration can only 
achieved through an inclusive method.  
 
Mitrany conflicted with many of the advocates of European integration in these two 
respects. He thought that European integration was to evolve in such a manner that it was 
going to be isolationist in the international scene and exclusionary in the regional scene. 
The former point was given special importance; inter-war isolationism on the part of the 
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United States had enabled many of the antagonists to deliver the world to the verge of 
destruction. As with Mitrany’s argument regarding the exclusionary nature of regional 
integration, the point of Turkey is a brilliant case that will touched upon in the third 
chapter. 
 
However plausible Mitrany’s ideas for their practical approach and respectful for their 
idealism, they are not immune to justified criticism. Some of his followers moved on with 
his ideas to coin the term neofunctionalism, to suggest a deeper understanding of 
functionalism. Lead by Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, neofunctionalists parted with the 
functionalists by saying that it was impossible to avoid organizational centralization when 
attaining integration. To materialize integration, there had to be a political agency directing 
the process rather than an incognitive and undirected bunch of technocrats seemingly 
leading nowhere. In this respect, they paid a good deal of attention to integration as a 
process as well as an outcome9; integration had to have a teleological aspect to it, in other 
words, it had to have a planned destination. The assumptions of the neofunctionalist school 
has more explanatory value in the face of the first years of the European integration; unlike 
the functionalist agenda, the integration did not create its ad hoc bodies to oversee the 
events. Even though with limited powers, there was a European Commission that had a set 
of goals in its hand in order to realize the creation of the common market. Moreover, 
European integration aimed to materialize a single market among its members so as to void 
the possibility of war between them in the future. 
 
Where neofunctionalism did not challenge functionalism, but built on it, was the primacy it 
attributed to the idea of satisfying welfare and material needs and not to politics. In this 
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respect, the neofunctionalists refuted the necessity of ideological zeal in the political 
agency of integration, just as Mitrany did. On the contrary, it was imperative for the 
neofunctionalist rationale to tackle issues by pure technical and practical reasoning rather 
than ideological dogma. This was also quite the case with the European Economic 
Community; political questions were not touched upon at all. The members addressed their 
problems from a technical outlook. It can even be said that as political objectives were 
included in the agenda of integration, then integration started to enter a stage of 
turbulence10. 
 
The neofunctionalist paradigm had a set of other assumptions as well, which helped 
enhance the understanding of integration. The most significant of these assumptions was a 
term called spillover. Spillover referred to the understanding of the necessity of certain 
prerequisites in order for integration to progress. Considering integration as a step-by-step 
process, it can only proceed when the benefits of the concurrent stage are obvious and 
gives incentive for the entities to proceed to another stage of the integration. Spillover, 
hence, is a concept where “imbalances created by the functional interdependence or 
inherent linkages of tasks can press political actors to redefine their common tasks”11. Put 
differently, common action in a given area may motivate actors with new desires, 
prospects, expectations to transfer cooperation into other areas. This was the crucial aspect 
of European integration; spillover in the field of coal and steel led the Europeans to move 
on to a common market. Once the common market was up and running, monetary union 
                                                                                                                                                                                
9 Rosamond, Ben. 2000. Theories of European Integration. New York: St.Martin’s Press, p.55 
10 It is fair to say that this was the case with President de Gaulle’s endeavors for obtaining a predominant 
position for France in the process of integration: this was what brought about the “empty chair crisis”. 
11 Nye. Joseph S. 1971. “Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neofunctionalist Model” in Leon N. 
Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Regional Cooperation: Theory and Research. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, p.200 
 15
and the completion of the single market became the task. Seeing the need to deepen 
integration, the Europeans eventually moved on to political cooperation and creating a 
common foreign and security policy. Even though Schmitter defined an alternative 
understanding to spillover, called spillback, where the depth and breadth of an international 
organization decreases12, this situation has remained largely hypothetical in the case of 
European integration. From where it stands now, the process of European integration has 
quite consolidated and carved on marble; it is very hard to reverse its accomplishments. 
Member states have abandoned their central banks, they abide by the rulings of the Court 
of Justice, and moreover, can only stay out over topic areas that they do not wish to 
partake, such as the case of Denmark and monetary union. On the other hand, deepening in 
these areas continues whether non-complying members like it or not. The only obstacle 
that will hinder European integration from further gaining root will be a hypothetical case 
where members will refuse to give up their powers to the center; but this has been far from 
the case. 
 
Spillover can be broken down threefold; functional spillover, where integration in one arm 
of industry will inevitably lead to integration in another; technical spillover, where 
different states will converge on each other’s standards for the sake of ease and/or 
harmony; political spillover, where the saturation of functional integration may reach such 
a point that political integration between the states in question will become unavoidable. 
As it can bee seen, these three subcategories of spillover complement each other. 
Throughout the history of the European Union, spillover in all three fields reinforced each 
                                                          
12 Schmitter, Philippe C. “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration” in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. 
Scheingold. 1971. Regional Cooperation: Theory and Research. Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
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other. Functional and technical spillover, reaching a level of fulfillment was translated to 
political spillover where members converged on their common political interests. 
 
Neofunctionalist explanations were almost hegemonic throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s 
when European integration was advancing at an unprecedented pace. However, as it will 
be depicted, new variants entered the equation and stalled the progress of integration 
during the 1970’s. Europe failed to move on to consolidating full economic integration as 
it had planned. The neofunctional paradigm’s linear pattern of progress seemed to 
underestimate the importance of the nation-states. 
 
1.1.4 The Intergovernmentalist-Supranationalist Divide 
Towards the end of the1960’s, perhaps even before that, there were quarrels within the 
members of the European Economic Community on very crucial issues. What was more 
interesting was that members found it quite reasonable to endeavor to promote their 
national interests against what was considered by the neofunctionalist school as a common 
interest appealing all of them. Moreover, there should have already been an overarching 
supranational technocracy, in this case the Commission, managing the integration so that it 
would proceed smoothly. Obviously, this was not the case. The Six cared more about the 
outcome of their quarterly consultations, Council of Ministers meetings, and summits than 
the Commission. Apparently, integration was more under their spell, unlike what the 
neofunctionalists stated.  
 
In this respect, another facet of integration theory has focused on the divide between 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The neofunctionalists had assumed that 
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integration would create a supranational authority and the states will joyfully comply with 
integration. Particularly owing to French President de Gaulle’s fairly successful efforts to 
revert the self-asserting progress of integration, neofunctionalist progress came to a halt13. 
De Gaulle had secured a veto procedure with the Luxembourg Compromise, enabling 
member countries to block decision that countered their national interests. The veto came 
as a great blow to the neofunctionalists. 
 
To explain why European integration fell under the spell of the nation-state, a blend of 
realists and gloating functionalists took on the lead. They pointed out the methodological 
fallacy of the neofunctionalist approach regarding the nation-state. The neofunctionalists 
spoke too soon and concluded too prematurely that the nation-state was in decline 
(Rosamond, 2000: 76). Integration was thought to be too much of a spatial and novel event 
for it to be bogged down by earthly matters. Accordingly, integration as a supranational 
occurrence was thought to avoid the nation-state, as the nation-state was in decline. The de 
Gaulle experience depicted the opposite. It was now time to grant some audience to the 
intergovernmentalist dimension of integration. 
 
Realist theory in International Relations always considered the states to be the primal 
entity in international affairs. They were naturally in conflict with each other and 
furthermore, they were thought to be reluctant to cooperate beyond matters concerning 
their tentative security. Thus, contact between states can only remain at an 
intergovernmental level. After the threat was eliminated, states would go back to their 
inherent conflictual modus vivendi. European integration proved that not only did states 
have more in common than their short-term survival as a common interest, but because 
                                                          
13 Rosamond, Ben. 2000. Theories of European Integration. New York: St.Martin’s Press, p.75 
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survival was not going to be at stake anymore, the state would be replaced by a 
supranational authority. On the other hand, the realist understanding of the state came back 
robust and refined and was still in control. Integration appeared to be able to move forward 
to the extent that the state allowed it. 
 
What weakened neofunctionalist theory, argues Stanley Hoffmann, was that its prophetic 
approach was not as promising as that of the security of the state system. His theory of 
diversity suggested that states’ differences cannot be underestimated and do pose a serious 
obstacle to supranational integration. Moreover,  
...losses are not compensated by gains on other (and especially not on other less vital) 
issues: nobody wants to be fooled. The logic of integration deems the uncertainties of the 
supranational function process creative; the logic of diversity sees them as destructive past 
a certain threshold; Russian roulette is fine only as long as the gun is filled with blanks 
(Hoffmann, 1966: 164). 
 
As neofunctionalism ceased to function temporarily, intergovernmentalism took the stage 
for a while. The assumption of the intergovernmentalist was that integration was not a 
straightforward event, nor a monolithic one. As William Wallace divided integration into 
two as formal, i.e. integration on issues relating to state sovereignty and independence, and 
informal, i.e. issues relating to economy and trade14, the question of why the state matters 
can be better illuminated. European states have been keen on informal integration, meaning 
that it is easy for them to concede on matters relating to informal issues. What matters is 
however, and something neofunctionalists failed to understand, is that the bottom line of 
integration lies in the formal matters. When encountered by issues relating to formal 
integration, states have a lower probability of integrating. Another dimension to the 
formal-informal dichotomy is that states maintain their stronghold on formal integration so 
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that informal integration can be contained. In other words, states have the final say over the 
direction that integration may take.  
 
What can be concluded about the intergovernmentalist approach is that it is to the point 
when considering the importance of the states’ attitudes for integration. On the other hand, 
the current destination that European integration has reached cannot necessarily be 
explained through states’ reluctance on formal integration. European integration, from 
where it stands now, appears to be a genuinely formal integration. In the past decade, EU 
members have achieved common ground on many formal integration issues, such as justice 
and police affairs, as well as security policy. In that respect, formal integration can still be 
part of the equation; no matter how intergovernmentalist integration is, spillover 
demonstrates the conditions for beneficial integration. 
 
1.2 The Essential History of the European Union 
The preceding section endeavored to set the perspective that the thesis takes in order to 
explain European integration. The spillover understanding is very important; it provides 
the researcher with the theoretical guide to understand how the process of European 
integration works. In this respect, the process of integration comes about as a supranational 
experience; it is not solely in the discretion of the member states as to how it will proceed 
and it can even be said that it dictates its conditions over the members. However, there is 
also a not-so-negligible intergovernmental factor that affects the progress of integration. 
Integration was brought about in the first place by governments with a vision of a peaceful 
Europe and was only promoted at their wishes. Also, enhancement in new fields of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
14 Wallace, William. “Introduction: The Dynamics of European Integration”, in William Wallace, ed. 1990. 
The Dynamics of European Integration. London: Pinter 
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integration, such as political cooperation and monetary union was brought forward and 
realized by the governments that adhered to them. In the following section, the history of 
the European Union will be analyzed in order to substantiate the point that European 
integration is progressing to such an extent that Europe is working on a CFSP. 
  
1.2.1 The 1950’s and 1960’s: From Paris to Rome to the Merger Treaty 
Following the Second World War, Western European countries were frightened at their 
second near-death experience in thirty years. They were aware that pursuing policies based 
on realpolitik were not going to be viable for any of them. Thus, some people thought that 
they would better cooperate with one another rather than be at each other’s throats. 
Moreover, there were growing concerns about Soviet intentions for Western Europe; its 
actions in Eastern Europe were not signaling positive things for Western Europe.  
 
1.2.1.1 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
One such concerned French entrepreneur, Jean Monnet, with his Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe, envisaged a plan that aimed at creating a united Europe where 
war was not only going to be merely unthinkable but materially impossible. He proposed 
to the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and the German Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer to lift all barriers on the coal and steel industries between the two countries, 
industries which were crucial in the arms race; the race that poisoned the two countries and 
the rest of Europe for so many years. The plan was also endorsed by the Benelux countries 
(Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg) that were already in a customs union with each 
other, and Italy. With the Paris Treaty of 1951, the High Authority for the European Coal 
and Steel Community was established with Jean Monnet as its President. The ECSC’s duty 
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was to administer the harmonization of the coal and steel industries in the member 
countries while increasing trade volume. It came as a success. Not only was there greater 
awareness of the merits of cooperation, but also the six countries decided to take the 
cooperation further. The spillover reasoning was working. 
 
1.2.1.2 The Rome Treaties and the European Economic Community (EEC) 
After concluding talks in March 1957, the Six signed the two Treaties of Rome, creating 
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom). Both treaties came into effect in January 1958. The Euratom aimed to create a 
regime in which the Six would harness research on nuclear technology for peaceful ends, 
not for military purposes. However, particularly owing to French concerns to develop their 
national nuclear deterrent, the Euratom remained a sidekick and was merged with the EEC 
in 1966 and it continued to remain insignificant (McCormick, 1996: 53). 
 
The EEC aimed to transform the member countries into a single market where the barriers 
on the free movement of services, goods, capital, but above all, people were removed. Not 
only did the EEC aimed at removing the barriers among its members, it also aimed to 
harmonize the agricultural and transport policies, as well as the trade policies of its 
members vis-a-vis third parties. For some, the convergence brought about by the Treaty of 
Rome was well beyond the classic free trade argument for cutting out high-cost and 
concentrating on efficiency where there was a comparative advantage15. Attention was 
drawn to the dynamic effects: the magnitude in the larger market for scale, specialization, 
                                                          
15 For a deeper understanding of  the benefits of economic integration, please refer to Pinder (1990), pp: 77-
96 
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and stronger competition; the consequent opportunities for higher investment, further 
innovation, and faster economic growth. 
 
The EEC was laden with two projects; the creation of a common market and thus a system 
where the actors will enhance and fortify a supranational entity. For the former it set an 
gradual 12 to 15-year period to remedy all the barriers such as trade quotas and tariffs. This 
element of gradualism in creating the single market was helpful in several ways. First, it 
helped to defeat the protectionists’ objections to the possible setbacks (such as competition 
from foreign firms) of the common market by proving its benefits. Second, an incremental 
way of action simply gave the member countries the time to adapt to the idea of the 
common market.  
 
1.2.1.3 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
Because the agricultural sectors constituted an integral part of the economies of the Six, 
they needed to set a common agricultural policy (CAP) to meet the needs of that sector. 
However, formulating a CAP was too complicated of a matter for the negotiations of the 
EEC Treaty and accordingly, its details were worked out later, with much quarrel. The aim 
of the CAP was to alleviate the standards of the agricultural communities within the EEC, 
as agricultural products have traditionally been more vulnerable to price fluctuations so 
there was an urge to protect farmers. Another reason for creating the CAP was about 
learning the lessons of the past, in particular from the Second World War. Before the war, 
many European countries were comfortable with importing food products, because it was 
cheaper to do so. To exemplify, the UK imported 70 percent of its food needs; wheat from 
the USA and Canada, sugar from South America and the Caribbean, and meat from 
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Argentina. The war demonstrated that reliance on imports for even the most basic food 
products was not bad business, but a security problem. 
 
The CAP was initiated after the conference in Stresa, Italy in July 1958 and underlined the 
promotion of a common market for agricultural products through two principles. First, it 
set a “Community preference” criteria, that is, Community produce was to be given 
priority over non-EEC originated produce. Second, the concept of joint financing 
sanctioned the equitable share of the costs of the CAP among member countries. In this 
respect, the EEC promised to buy surplus produce to keep prices high and sell the surplus 
back to the market if the prices went too high. The CAP was set to be completed by the end 
of the 12 to 15-year transitional period. 
 
During the transitional period, French President Charles de Gaulle’s insistence on having 
lower prices for wheat (to counter the competitive German wheat) and on making the 
Community institutions pay for the CAP, as opposed to the member states themselves 
(which he saw as a disadvantage to France), impeded agreement. Something odd happened 
at one point when France withdrew from the European Council, creating the notorious 
“empty chair” crisis. Following French presidential elections in 1965 however, de Gaulle 
thought he should better move back to the Council meetings as acting otherwise did not 
reap any benefits for France; the other EEC members ignored the French bluff. However, 
de Gaulle asked the other five to give up majority voting on very crucial issues, such as 
CAP. This event was known as the “Luxembourg Compromise”; decisions on important 
questions were to be taken by unanimity instead of majority voting, giving members the 
option to veto decisions that ran against their interest. The veto was to remain intact for 
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almost two decades and it should be said that it was one of the biggest factors that disabled 
the EEC from gaining depth, limiting its scope to an intergovernmental organization 
(Dinan, 1999:48).  
 
Even though in 1967 the CAP was formulated so that member states had to pay for their 
own surplus, financing surplus produce became the task of the Community later on. The 
CAP entered a vicious circle where farmers drastically continued to increase supply, keen 
to enjoy more of the high prices provided by the EEC, and the EEC consistently paying the 
farmers for their produce, disregarding the level of demand from the market. In 1971, 
Commissioner Sicco Mansholt, who was the Dutch Agriculture Minister back in 1958 and 
was the locomotive of the commencement of the CAP, proposed reform to remedy the 
growing problem; it was obvious that the CAP was going to be a great liability on the 
Community sooner or later. On the other hand, not much was done until the 1980’s, when 
EEC agricultural products were tremendously more expensive than those in the world 
market and the EEC found itself self storing “mountains of butter and meat”, as well as 
“lakes of wine.” To solve the problem, though a quite absurd way it was, the EEC decided 
to pay farmers for not toiling their land16. What can be said about the situation of the CAP 
today is that it is peculiarly interventionist as well as inefficient and strict price controls are 
kept by the Union, unlike other areas where it has greatly become non-interventionist. 
Major reforms are still in consideration as the thesis is written17. 
 
                                                          
16 This also relates to the insistence of many Frenchmen to live in the countryside. For more on CAP, please 
refer to McCormick (1996): 241-257 
17 One of the topics at the Seville European Council last June was CAP reform, but the substance of the 
reforms are still not fully agreed upon. 
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1.2.1.4 Trials of Political Integration: European Defense Community (EDC), 
European Political Community and the Fouchet Plan 
Even before the ECSC began working, the federalists, led by Jean Monnet, wanted 
something bigger, and as fast as possible. Thus, in 1952 they immediately proposed the 
creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) which was to put the armed forces of 
the member countries under a joint command. Just as the ECSC created a common market 
for coal and steel, the EDC was to create a European army tied to the political institutions 
of a United Europe (McCormick, 1996: 51). Even though the EDC Treaty was promoted 
by the French and signed by the Six, it failed to obtain ratification from the French 
National Assembly in 1954. Different factions within the French Parliament were 
suspicious towards the EDC for different reasons. First, all factions disliked the idea of 
German military rearmament; the memories of the Second World War were still fresh. On 
the part of the Gaullists, they disliked the idea of the EDC because it posed a significant 
restriction on French national interests. The Communists resented the idea of common 
action against the Soviets, as the EDC was created against possible Soviet aggression. Not 
only was there resistance on the part of the French National Assembly, the French military 
was quite embarrassed about its poor performance in Indochina and did not wish to be 
bogged down in any conflict at all. In addition, the problem was that the idea of a 
European army was stillborn. Europeans were quite unprepared to give up an integral 
component of their national sovereignty for the sake of a yet vague idea of “Europe”. Plus, 
the EDC did not include the United Kingdom - because of British reluctance to join - at the 
time the biggest military force in Europe second to the Soviet Union. The first plan to 
create a common European security organ was therefore unsuccessful.  
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In 1955, with the failure of the EDC proposal, the Six plus the UK signed a modified 
version of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 (of which the UK was also a signatory), creating the 
Western European Union, an advisory body aimed to coordinate security policy among 
member countries. The original Brussels Treaty was an attempt to direct Western 
Europeans to their collective security. It was followed by the Washington Treaty the 
following year, which created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Through 
NATO, the United States formally tied itself to the defense of Western Europe and there 
was not much left to be done by the WEU. Hence, it acted as a mere advisory body that 
remained predominantly dormant throughout the Cold War. Following the conclusion of 
the Cold War, however, the WEU regained momentum and was at the focus of 
constructing a new security understanding for Western Europe. The importance of the 
WEU for the CFSP and the EU shall be analyzed in detail in the second chapter. 
 
Another attempt where political integration failed was the European Political Community. 
It was intended to be the first stride for a federal Europe. However, a common political 
denominator for the Europeans was absent and this undermined prospects for political 
integration. Because Europe lacked such a common political vision, the aim of the EDC to 
tie the European army to a “United” Europe was a lacunae. Paradoxically, the “United” 
Europe was divided in terms of having a common foreign policy and for this reason there 
was no reason to talk about political integration. Also, the relative power of the federalists 
in Europe was still weak for them to influence decisions to direct Europe to a federative 
network. 
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A less ambitious plan for political integration came in 1961 with what was called the 
Fouchet Plan. The Fouchet plan was strictly intergovernmentalist in its appeal, and aimed 
to create a political medium outside the EEC for European countries to discuss their 
agenda. The plan received no support because it appeared as a sham task to strengthen the 
French grip over the process of European integration (Dinan,1999:43). Also, it was the 
federalists’ turn to hit back this time; they opposed the idea of greater national control over 
integration.  
 
1.2.2 Late 1960’s to Late 1980’s: From Common Market to Single Market 
With the Merger Treaty of 1965, the three different institutions of European integration, 
the ECSC, the Euratom, and the EEC were all merged under the Council of Ministers and 
the Commission of the European Communities. As the EEC became merged, it had a 
common Parliament and a Court of Justice, two institutions that became the legislative and 
judiciary bodies of the EEC.  With the merger onwards, the EEC tried to head towards new 
directions. It tried to enlarge to new members, such as the UK and the Nordic countries, 
desiring to increase its breadth, as well as increasing the scope of its activities, such as 
economic and monetary union, in order to deepen integration. 
 
1.2.2.1 The 1970’s: Decade of Setback and Advance: Trials for Monetary Integration, 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), First Enlargement, Bridging the Democratic 
Deficit 
By the end of the 1960’s, there was still not much progress for political cooperation, lest 
political integration, and the need for regular consultations between member countries was 
more imminent than ever, as the amount and urgency of the issues on the floor were 
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increasing. Thus, the Davignon report of 1970, which recommended regular meetings 
among EEC ministers, liaison among EEC ambassadors in foreign capitals, and common 
instructions for those ambassadors on certain issues, was adopted. As a result, a 
coordinated foreign policy was to be followed under what came to be known as the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC). As the CFSP is built on the EPC, its development 
is elaborated in the second chapter.  
 
Entering the 1970’s, the EEC, in trying to establish monetary union, faced several 
challenges in the light of the concurrent events in the international scene. The first was the 
American withdrawal from the Bretton-Woods system in August 1971, which was created 
in 1944 to establish a fixed exchange system to foster international trade. For the 
misfortune of the Europeans, they had established a fixed exchange system quite shortly 
before the Bretton-Woods collapsed and the initial trial to create a common currency 
within the Community was repelled. Second, also owing a good deal to the end of the 
Bretton-Woods arrangements but also to the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, came the oil shock 
when oil producing countries drastically increased the price of oil. This rise in the price of 
oil significantly altered the balance of payments of the EEC countries, which were 
predominantly dependent on the oil coming from the Middle East. Increasing budget 
deficits impeded further monetary integration. 
 
Monetary union was an obvious goal when one thinks about the requirements of a single 
market. In the 19th century, German and Italian unification materialized when a single 
currency was introduced. Not only was monetary integration required for economic 
integration, having a single currency over a given territory has been one of the traditional 
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aspects of political integration (Balassa, 1962). Accordingly, in order to move on with 
integration EEC members were aware of the need to come up with common monetary 
mechanisms; it was a sine qua non if integration was to be given a deeper meaning. 
 
Earliest plans for establishing some form of a monetary union was constantly met with the 
challenge of the member states most keen on their national sovereignty, especially from 
Gaullist France. With de Gaulle gone, and his replacement by a more moderate Georges 
Pompidou, as well as the incumbency of an even more pro-EEC Willy Brandt in Germany, 
work began to progress to complete economic and monetary union (EMU), following a 
summit of EEC members in the Hague in 1969. The Six agreed to move on with an EMU 
by 1980. To realize this goal, they agreed to stabilize their exchange rates within a plus or 
minus 1.125 percent of the US dollar (McCormick,1996:233-236)18, in a system known as 
the “snake in the tunnel”. 
 
As it was mentioned, the task floundered because the Nixon administration pulled out of 
the Bretton-Woods fixed exchange system, rendering the pillar of the US dollar pointless. 
The plan to complete EMU by 1980 was dismissed. However, the imperative to attain 
EMU was not so easy to abandon and for this reason a new initiative was taken by the 
EEC. In what was called the European Monetary System (EMS), an Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) was established with a European Currency Unit (ECU). The EMS was 
much more flexible than the snake; it set adjustable fixed exchange rates with larger 
margins for countries with particularly weak currencies, such as Italy 
McCormick,1996:66). The EMS aimed to provide the necessary monetary stability for the 
                                                          
18 The margin is said to be plus or minus 2.5 percent elsewhere, for example in Dinan, 1999: 69. 
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single market as well as a psychological adjustment for the EEC members to the idea of a 
single European currency. 
 
With the introduction of the Single European Act in 1986, the President of the European 
Commission, Jacques Delors took the initiative to elaborate monetary union with a three-
staged plan19. First, all twelve EEC members were to join the ERM by 1990. Second, a 
European System of Central Banks (Eurofed) would be created by 1994 to coordinate and 
eventually overtake the responsibilities of national central banks. Later on, however, a 
more modest European Monetary Institute was established. The third stage was to be the 
creation of the single currency. To complete stage three, member countries would have to 
uphold the principles of the Maastricht Treaty that relate to monetary integration. 
Moreover, participating countries will have to keep their currencies within the limits of the 
ERM and will not devalue their currencies for at least two years. The Delors plan came 
more or less as a success as the single currency was realized, although with some setbacks.  
 
Coming back to the 1970’s, not every occurrence throughout the decade was a hindrance 
for European integration. 1973 marked the first enlargement of the Six to the Nine with the 
accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. Even though the UK was to act 
mainly as a decelerating force to European integration, its presence has strengthened the 
process more than weakening it. This statement can be attributed to two facts; the UK has 
been more of a contributor to the EEC budget than a recipient from it and this has helped 
ease the tension on the EEC’s budget, especially for the CAP. Second, being a somewhat 
less tangible reason, is that the UK’s absence in the process of European integration meant 
                                                          
19 The renowned Delors Plan is adequately outlined in the EU’s website: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/publications/brochures/docu/10lecons/txt_en.html  
 31
the absence of an important country from the process. European integration looked 
incomplete when the UK remained out of it. 
 
Another milestone for the EEC is the year 1979, when for the first time members of the 
European Parliament began to be elected by direct vote. This created for the first time a 
real democratic institution within the European integration process. It was a novel event as 
democratic accountability was (and indeed still is) the greatest missing component in 
European integration. Moreover, direct elections to the European Parliament gave the EEC 
more of a supranational character as citizens of Europe had the opportunity to have real 
contact with an EU institution. This is an important aspect for the question of European 
integration because even though the EU’s rise as an international actor is constantly 
problematized, it can be doubted how solid the EU’s stance can be if its policies are not 
formulated by its people. Thus, it can be safely said that one aspect of the progress of 
European integration depends on the democratization of the EU’s institutions.  
 
1.2.2.2 The 1980’s: Second Enlargement, Completion of the Single Market, German 
Reunification 
By the 1980’s, the EEC was simply referred to as the European Community (EC) and 
witnessed another round of enlargement, this time towards the south, when Greece became 
a member in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Their inclusion had mixed 
results. The second enlargement made the EC the largest trading bloc in the world while 
the increase from the Nine to the Twelve has made decision-making a much more 
complicated matter, weakening France and Germany’s eminent position within the EC. 
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The other important development for the process of European integration during the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s was the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. By the 1980’s, 
integration had still remained incomplete. Even though the common market was in place, 
there were still non-tariff barriers, such as restrictions on the movement of people, different 
health, technical, and quality standards as well as different levels of value-added tax 
(VAT). The consolidation of the single market could have only been achieved when these 
barriers were lifted. 
 
The remarkable event for moving on to the single market and repelling the above-
mentioned obstacles was with the Cassis de Dijon case of the European Court of Justice 
verdict of 197920. The case was a dispute between Germany and France when Germany 
refused to allow the French fruit liqueur, Cassis de Dijon, to be sold in Germany on the 
grounds that it did not meet its standards for alcoholic beverages. The Court ruled that this 
was against the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, stating that a given member country cannot 
refuse to allow the sale of a product from another member country because it does not meet 
its own health standards; a product that fulfilled the health standards of one member 
country was to be accepted healthy in other member countries. Several other cases 
followed where the Court gave verdicts consistent with the Cassis de Dijon, trail-blazing 
the way for the single market as member countries were forced to accept one another’s 
standards.  
 
                                                          
20 Although underestimated elsewhere, some of the ECJ’s verdicts have had boosting effects for integration 
to progress. For example, the Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62) and the Costa v. ENEL (Case 6/64) were of a 
significant contribution for the establishment of the Rome Treaty as a supranational European law. An 
adequate coverage of the ECJ is at McCormick, 1996:164-181.   
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When the Twelve signed the Single European Act in 1986, they envisaged to remove all 
physical barriers (i.e. customs and passport controls), fiscal barriers (i.e. different levels of 
indirect taxation) and technical barriers (i.e. conflicting standards, laws, and regulations). 
There was a basic reason for the EC members to consolidate the single market, even more 
than ECJ precedents, argues David Cameron, and that was the increasing intra-EC trade21. 
Moreover, the EMS was up and running, thus, a relatively stable monetary system 
guaranteed the stability of intra-EC trade. Cameron further argues that there were growing 
concerns on the fragmentation of the market and the risks that this posed for the member 
countries, such as worsening unemployment and declining levels of growth.  
 
Towards the end of the 1980’s, the world witnessed the demise of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR), an event with a magnitude that history has yet to comprehend. German 
reunification came about when the GDR joined the Federal Republic of Germany in 
October 1990. The German reunification was significant for the process of European 
integration for several reasons. First, in order to pay the burden of reunification, 
Germany’s predominance within the EEC was slightly weakened. The task of remedying 
the disadvantages of the communist system in the GDR and creating a fairly egalitarian 
economic system for all Germans presented itself as a task too important for the Kohl 
government to neglect. Second, German reunification brought about suspicions towards a 
possible resurfacing of German nationalism. Especially Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
of the UK was concerned for the resurgence of German nationalism, as she had seen the 
destruction delivered by Nazi Germany22. Even though similarly concerned, but less 
                                                          
21 Cameron, David R. 1992. “The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences” in Alberta Sbragia (ed.) Euro-
Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community. Washington, DC: Brookings 
22 Referring to his address to Mrs. Thatcher at his capacity as a senior advisor, Prof. Norman Stone recalls 
that he had tried to convince her  that East Germany was not a powerhouse, but “twelve enormous 
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anxious, France wanted to anchor Germany to the West by strengthening their mutual 
bonds (Pinder,1998:19). Not surprisingly, Germany also borne somewhere in the back of 
its mind of the lessons of the past and wanted to anchor itself much firmly to the West, 
which brought it peace, security, and prosperity for over forty years. The sum of these 
concerns led the EC to the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
1.2.2.3 The Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
Finally setting the trend for European integration came the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. With 
the completion of the single market, the EC (from Maastricht onwards became the 
European Union) now started moving towards political union. The Maastricht Treaty 
established three pillars for the EU, as well as other fields of responsibility which set its 
future. The first pillar of the EU was to be the strengthened European Community, in other 
words, the economic foothold; the second pillar was to be the Union’s common foreign 
and security policy; and the third pillar, was to comprise of justice and home affairs.  
 
In order to substantiate the pillars, certain institutions and criteria were formulated. On the 
part of the European Community, and in accordance with the Delors plan of 1989, 
Maastricht initiated a timetable for the creation of a single European currency by January 
1999. Further on, while member countries’ gross national debt was not to exceed sixty 
percent of their gross domestic product, their fiscal budget was not to have a deficit of 
more than three percent. Failure to meet these standards is enforced with fines of up to half 
a percent of the faulty country’s GDP. The novelty of the economic standards envisaged by 
the Maastricht Treaty is that they completely undermine the classic understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Liverpools, handed over to the West Germans in a tatty cardboard box, with a great red ribbon round it, 
marked ‘From Russia with Love’ ”. From Prof. Stone’s column in the Sunday Times, September 29th 1996. 
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sovereignty, especially in financial matters. Standardization of taxes was already outlined 
by the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty took the remnants of the members’ financial 
autonomy away from them, thus strengthening the European Union as a supranational 
organ (Karatekelioğlu,2000:140). 
 
More related to the subject matter of this thesis, Maastricht marked the creation of a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union. The CFSP replaced the 
EPC arrangements and was to “...include all questions related to the security of the Union, 
including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a 
common defense” (Title V, Article J.4). The CFSP, unlike the EPC, was not a mere 
cooperative entity, on the contrary, as Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty suggests, it 
included (and was not going to be limited to) all aspects regarding the security of the 
Union. It was worked out to give the EU a political significance. Furthermore, it required 
EU members to act in harmony with the Union’s second pillar policies, or at least not to 
undermine them (Article J.1, Clause 4). 
 
The third pillar, justice and home affairs, is also an important component of the European 
Union and its future as a supranational political actor. With the Maastricht Treaty, EU 
members focused on harmonizing their judicial and police affairs. This is also a novel 
event for students of political science and international relations, as it also marks an 
important drift (just like the CFSP does) from the classic notion of the nation-state 
(Karatekelioğlu, 2000:143) . It has been the typical characteristic of the modern nation-
state to have the sole control over its internal judicial affairs, in other words, having the 
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first and final say over its own territory. Hence, with the creation of the third pillar, the 
European Union enabled members to “interfere” with each other’s internal “business”.  
 
The third pillar created a number of procedures and institutions, in a fashion similar in 
meaning to those of the other two pillars. Institutionally, the Maastricht Treaty created a 
European police intelligence agency (Europol) which aimed to create an intelligence 
network among the EU members to aid them combat organized crime and terrorism23. In 
parallel, EU members have set up channels to coordinate policies in the fields of asylum 
and immigration, as well as the extradition of suspects and criminals.  
 
Another important aspect related with the third pillar is the creation of the Committee of 
the Regions (CoR). The disparities in wealth and income across Western Europe have 
always posed a handicap to the process of integration; accordingly, one cannot talk of a 
meaningful economic and political union, lest a single market when some parts of the EU 
are remarkably richer or poorer than others. To remedy this problem, a European Regional 
Development Fund was created as early as 1975, accompanied by the ad hoc Assembly of 
European Regions (1985) and the Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities 
under the European Commission (1988). However, the Union needed a stronger response, 
and created the CoR. The CoR is formed of some 220 members, most of whom are elected 
local government officials, appointed by the member states and it provides a medium to 
discuss the members’ views on their respective regions’ problems. Even though some 
scholars have questioned the need for a local voice in the Union (McCormick,1996), as the 
Parliament serves that goal, the existence of a CoR where ordinary Europeans promote 
                                                          
23 It must be said that even though organized crime and terrorism seem to be under the jurisdiction of the 
third pillar, they are relevant to the duties of the CFSP. This point shall be covered in the second chapter. 
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their very local agenda – and not necessarily their government’s - may bridge the chasm 
between the EU and its citizens.  
 
1.2.3 Developments After Maastricht: Deepening and Widening (1992-2000) 
The Maastricht Treaty has been a watershed in the process of European integration. In the 
first place, it replaced the name “Community” with the “Union”: it is no more a 
conglomeration of European countries, but a genuine union amongst them. European 
integration, with the move towards a united Europe has gained depth. It is not a mere trade 
club of several countries anymore; it is increasingly becoming a political actor with 
internal cohesion and international significance, an actor that is moving towards gaining 
statehood. It has created a set of institutions and procedures in order to oversee the smooth 
operation of the pillars on which it rests. It is overtaking political objectives, such as the 
creation of a CFSP and in this respect increasingly becomes a supranational entity. 
Moreover, it has provided a medium of peace, security, but above all, prosperity in Europe 
for the past fifty years so that it has accomplished Jean Monnet’s project of making war not 
only unthinkable, but materially impossible. Owing to this impossibility, it is safe to argue 
that it will be very hard for European integration to be reversed from this point onwards. 
Indeed, the events following Maastricht fortifies this statement.  
 
The events in the post-Maastricht era have been influenced by a deepening-widening 
paradigm. While deepening has meant the convergence of ties amongst members of the 
EU, widening meant the inclusion of other European countries to the club 
(Dinan,1999:160). The first move to defining both an enlarged and a deepened Europe, 
came with the EU summit in Copenhagen in 1992, which outlined the criteria of EU 
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membership for prospective countries (Dinan,1999:190). More commonly known as the 
Copenhagen criteria, EU membership was to be granted to a European country only if it 
was; first, democratic and respectful to human rights and minority rights, and second, if it 
was able to compete within, and prepared to take on the obligations of, the single market24. 
In this respect, the idea of Europe has been thought by different parties (particularly in a 
British vs. others way) with contrasting recommendations, in light of the deepening-
widening divide. Especially the continental members have been favorable to the idea of 
deepening while the British have kept their distance towards deepening. London, until 
recently, has been more favorable to the idea of diluting the EU because of a traditional 
skepticism on the part of the British towards the idea of Europe. Even though many British 
do not consider themselves to be European at all, a decent number of EU citizens from 
other member countries do adhere to a European identity. The idea of widening, in other 
words enlargement, especially that towards Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEEC), is embraced by all members25. The question of enlargement towards the East has 
become more of a matter of time than a matter of debate. Especially on the part of 
Germany, which has assigned itself a historic mission to bring peace and prosperity to the 
CEEC’s, out of the regret which it feels for its deeds during the Second World War, has 
been a keen advocate of enlargement towards CEEC’s. In addition, the ethnic violence 
followed by the breakdown of former Yugoslavia concerned the EU regarding potential 
ethnic and national divisions that might also inflame violence in the CEEC’s26. Further on, 
the bitter experiences of former Yugoslavia has put the EU’s inertia as a political force 
                                                          
24 These criteria were further consolidated with the Agenda 2000 (Dinan,1999:192). 
25 Meanwhile, the third wave of the enlargement of the EU came in 1995 when Austria, Finland and Sweden 
joined. Their inclusion did not present a challenge to the EU as these countries had consolidated their 
economic and political well-being and did not become a digestion problem for the Union. 
26 Lippert, Barbara. “Relations with Central and Eastern European Countries: The Anchor Role of the 
European Union” in Regelsberger, Elfriede et.al. 1997. Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to 
CFSP and Beyond. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers 
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under attack, an entity that is largely dependent on the United States for providing for the 
security of its backyard.  
 
As with deepening, a number of summit and conferences were held amongst EU countries, 
resulting in several treaties. The process of monetary union was enhanced following the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997). The timetable set by the Delors plan was complied with almost 
perfectly, as well as the principles under the Maastricht Treaty. As a result, euro notes and 
coins have replaced national currencies starting from January 2002. Three members opted 
out of the euro however. The UK, for its typical Euroskepticism; Denmark, because of the 
reservations it put on not joining the CFSP and monetary union when ratifying the 
Maastricht Treaty; and Sweden, because of its reluctance to put its budget under EU 
control owing to its extensive welfare system. 
 
Other important developments under the Amsterdam Treaty related to deepening in the 
second pillar. As Maastricht provided consultations between the Council, the Commission 
and the European Parliament, Amsterdam specified that any increase in the operational 
expenditures of the CFSP had to be accepted by the Parliament, thus, foreign policy 
implementation was placed under the EU’s legislature. While the Maastricht Treaty 
yielded a defense provision, as well as incorporating the WEU in the EU, British and 
Dutch resistance mounted as they paid importance to their NATO commitments. Thus, 
much on the second pillar remained on paper until the Amsterdam Treaty, when Britain 
allowed the Council to discuss the framing of a common defense policy. With British 
resistance eased, Amsterdam added the need to foster closer relations with the WEU, and 
its eventual incorporation to the EU. Moreover, it set the scope of operations for the CFSP; 
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the operations under the CFSP were going to be humanitarian, rescue, and peacekeeping 
tasks, as well as the use of combat forces in peacemaking.  
 
Then came the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. The Council was important 
for several reasons. First, it set the deadline for the creation of the European army as the 
end of 2003. Thus, there now was a clear date for the creation of a standing European 
army27. Second, in order to overlook and implement the Union’s common foreign and 
security policy, the office of a High Representative of the European Council for the CFSP 
was formed. The office of the High Representative enabled a more efficient way in forging 
the CFSP by overseeing the technical and bureaucratic matters relating to the second pillar. 
Simply put, the High Representative has become a blend of a foreign and defense minister 
for the EU. 
 
The latest significant development for the European Union came with the Nice Treaty of 
2000. Nice readjusted the weight of votes in the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, 
two of the legislative organs of the EU, for the members and the candidates when the EU 
enlarges from fifteen to twenty-seven. More importantly, however, the Treaty introduced 
the concept of triple majority; that Council decisions require not only a qualified majority 
(slightly larger than before) but also an absolute majority of the number of member states 
and, at a country’s request, a 62 percent majority of the total population of EU countries. 
Previous arrangements regarding voting did include the first two principles, qualified 
majority and country majority, but the third principle on population majority is novel. Even 
though the Nice Treaty is going to come into effect by 2005, and that candidate countries 
                                                          
27 The EDC army fifty years ago was most probably going to look much alike the European army today. It is 
arguable that the past fifty years’ spillovers have more easily brought the EU to the creation of such an army. 
 41
may secure a different share of vote during their accession negotiations, the population 
principle will be upheld. This will enable a coalition made of Germany, the EU member 
with the largest population, and two other larger members to block any decision in the 
Council. Even though unlikely, there is a threat that decision-making in the Council will be 
stalled. This will be an undesired setback for the process of integration, on the other hand, 
it is yet to be seen how the Nice arrangements will work. 
 
1. 3 Conclusion 
In the preceding sections, the debate behind the origins and the development of European 
integration was set. The EC was initially a strictly intergovernmental institution and later 
moved for deeper integration on many fields, entering the 21st century firm and robust. 
While monetary union was hardly a reality in the early 1970’s, today only three national 
currencies are still existence against the euro. Moreover, European integration endeavored 
to create a European army through the EDC and a joint political decision-making body 
with the European Political Community fifty years ago but failed. Today, both projects 
have materialized and looking only at these shows how important the EU is.  
 
As the European Union moves on, and attains both internal and international significance, 
the problems ahead of it are as great as its past achievements. These problems can be 
differentiated as internal and external. Internally, the EU has to obtain more harmony, 
meaning that dissent on crucial issues such as monetary union and agriculture is not 
helping the consolidation of the integration. The European Union can only progress 
towards a politically significant identity to the extent that all members’ participation is 
secured. In other words, all members’ inclusion in the deepening dimension of the EU is 
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imperative for the EU’s progress towards the completion of integration. Another internal 
problem that the EU might face is the complication of the decision-making process 
following the upcoming enlargement. It is almost certain that by 2005, the EU15 is going 
to become the EU25 and this is going to drastically alter the way and outcomes of 
decision-making. As it was stated when mentioning the Nice Treaty, the EU has redefined 
respective votes for the members and potential members and the solution to the problem 
does not seem to offer a treatment, on the contrary, decision-making can become even 
more cumbersome. It may be very hard to produce substantial results on hot issues, such as 
the advancement of the CFSP or reform in CAP, when obtaining a blocking minority by 
the larger members is going to be so easy. As it has been said, it is these hot issues that is 
going to determine the EU’s future, that is, whether it is going to be able to move on to the 
next stage of integration. 
 
It needs to be said that the CFSP dimension on the outcome of integration is especially 
important. Many new diverse challenges face the EU and it is at the EU’s discretion of 
tackling these challenges. Forging a CFSP will determine how secure Europe will be and 
how much integration will progress any further. More importantly, it is this pillar of the 
EU that is going to raise a good deal of debate and divide within the Union in the following 
years, because it denotes one of the last reserved domains of the states’ sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE SECOND PILLAR 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the European Union is emerging as a political entity with 
international significance. It has endeavored to establish itself as an organization that pursues 
foreign policy objectives in line with the common security interests of its members. The 
previous chapter depicted how the European Union transformed to its current existence as a 
global economic powerhouse and a supranational actor. Furthermore, it has been argued that 
the EU’s second pillar, that is, its common foreign and security policy (CFSP), is going to be 
one of the next big leaps for the European Union.  
 
This chapter is going to look at the background of the CFSP by analyzing how the EU, at the 
time when it was the EC, tried to formulate a common voice in foreign policy and 
communicated with the United States and NATO throughout the Cold War. Further on, the 
chapter is going to provide insight to how European security concerns were shaped and how 
the European Union addressed these concerns in the post-Cold War era. In other words, it is 
aimed to understand the meaning of the CFSP for the EU and for international relations. 
 
2.1 Historical Background: Relations in Europe and the World During the Cold War 
2.1.1 1945-1955: The Cold War Commences  
When Germany was crushed by the Allies in April 1945, the Second World War ended for 
Europe. Especially two of the Allies rose to overwhelming prominence in international affairs 
due to their success in the war; the United States and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the 
two parties had conflicting views on the future of Germany and Europe. The Americans 
wanted to get rid of the Nazi apparatus, disarm and demilitarize Germany, and democratize 
the country in order not to be bogged down again in something like the Second World War. 
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They wanted to get rid of all the residues of the Hitler regime in order to create a stable 
Europe. The Soviets, on the other hand, wanted to extend their Eastern Europe shield all the 
way to the Rhine by persuading the Americans to leave Germany.  
 
Meanwhile, things were not bright elsewhere in Europe. Countries were falling under the 
spell of Communism one by one; to depict the jeopardy, Winston Churchill coined the term 
“Iron Curtain” as early as March 1946, to refer to the Soviets’ grip over Eastern Europe. By 
1947, all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with the exception of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, had turned Communist. Alarmed by this, Washington replaced its policy of 
cooperation with Moscow with what came to be known as containment1, that is, containing 
Communism to countries where it is already in control. At the time of this policy shift, there 
was a Communist insurgency in Greece, supported by Yugoslavia and dubiously the Soviet 
Union, and Turkey was being pressurized by the Soviets to allow them to open bases in the 
Turkish Straits, as well as to hand over some of its provinces in the east. The British promised 
to help the two countries but it was undergoing an economic crisis, so it withdrew its 
commitments. Anxious not see these two countries bow to Communism as well, US President 
Harry Truman asked the Congress in 1947 to support him on an aid package, known as the 
Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine marked a clear change of the official American  
policy towards the Soviets after the war in favor of the containment idea, indeed marking the 
beginning of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine was 
designed to help Turkey and Greece tackle their problems by giving them military and 
economic aid, and it worked. The insurgency died down in Greece, while the Soviet Union 
eased its pressures over Turkey, seeing the Americans’ support for Turkey.  
                                                          
1 Nye, Joseph S. and Robert O. Keohane. “The United States and International Institutions in Europe after the 
Cold War” in Keohane, Robert O., Joseph S. Nye and Stanley Hoffmann (eds.) 1993. After the Cold War: 
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
p.108 
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In the mean time, the question of what was to be done with an obliterated Germany and the 
rest of the destroyed lands of Europe became more pressing. Now that the Hitler regime was 
gone, the starvation that hit hard the people of Europe became the priority. The greatest fear 
on the part of the Americans was that Communism would appeal to the Europeans who were 
suffering and bring the Communists to power in the rest of Europe, creating an even larger 
Soviet sphere of influence that not even the Americans can counter. Accordingly, under the 
Marshall Plan, named for its designer US Secretary of State George C. Marshall, set up in 
1948, European countries were to receive economic aid from the United States, so as to help 
Europe put its economy back on track while averting the threat of Communist appeal and also 
to create a useful trading partner for the US. The Marshall Plan was a shining success; not 
only did the European economies got on track thus provide internal stability, the merits of 
cooperation proved to the international community that there was more to gain from 
cooperation than from conflict. 
 
As it was stated, the Soviet Union was in control of half of Europe and seemed uncooperative 
in the management of international affairs, much to the concern of the United States. First, 
Stalin wanted the French, the Americans and the British out of Berlin and keep the city for 
himself, which was under the joint administration of the Allies. But more importantly, he 
wanted to place Germany under Soviet control so that it would not cause any more trouble for 
him. The Americans, however, felt less insecure about Germany and wanted it to be 
democratic, peaceful and prosperous. Hence, the Western allies introduced a new currency, 
the Deutschmark, in their zones in June 1948 so as to bring about economic stability. This 
alarmed the Soviets as they saw this as a first step towards dividing the Germany which they 
wanted for themselves. To force the Americans out, Stalin ordered the blockade of Berlin, 
which lay deep in the Russian controlled part of Germany. The Americans and the British 
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accepted the deal and started airlifting supplies into Berlin. Stalin gave up his ambitions for 
Berlin in May 1949 and called off the blockade. It was obvious that the Americans were not 
going to abandon the symbolically important Berlin, as otherwise, it would signal a great loss 
of prestige for them. 
 
Seeing that they cannot cooperate with Moscow over Germany, the United States, France and 
the United Kingdom decided to allow the West Germans to establish the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the summer of 1949. The Soviets retaliated by encouraging a Communist 
government to be established in East Germany under the title of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR). It appeared that neither side was going to give up its part of Germany for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
While all of this was happening, the Europeans themselves were not standing by idly. In 
March 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK signed the Brussels 
Treaty and founded the Brussels Treaty Organization. Even though the treaty was devised to 
enhance cooperation between the signatories in economic, political, and cultural matters, it 
also suggested that all signing countries would defend each other if one of them was to be 
attacked (Article 4), the aggressor here obviously being the Soviet Union. However, they 
were aware of the fact that security in Western Europe cannot be attained without American 
help2. The answer came next year on April with the Washington Treaty (signed by the USA, 
Canada, Iceland, the UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal and Italy), which created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its 
essence was that if any of its members would be attacked by a non-member country, it was 
the duty for all members to aid the attacked ally (Article 5).  
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The creation of NATO in reality superseded the Brussels Treaty Organization, but, on paper, 
commitment to the Brussels Treaty was not abandoned for a set of fairly obvious reasons. For 
one thing, the Brussels Treaty also envisaged economic, social, and cultural cooperation 
among its signatories; it was not merely an alliance and there was a reason beyond military 
matters to keep the treaty. What was more important than these reasons was that a Communist 
uprising in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 seized power, greatly alarming the Europeans of 
the growing Soviet threat. So, they saw reason to stick together strongly, otherwise fall to the 
Soviets individually. 
 
There was alarm on the part of the Americans too. War broke out in Korea in 1950 when 
Communist North Korea, apparently supported by the Soviets and the Chinese, attacked 
American-sponsored South Korea. Accordingly, Americans felt that they can only prevent 
something similar from happening in Western Europe by encouraging stronger cooperation 
amongst Europeans. In this direction, the Americans started rearming the West Germans in 
order to strengthen their hold on Europe. Driven by these concerns, a European Defense 
Community (EDC) was endeavored to be set up by the members of the Brussels Treaty 
Organization, and was going to include Germany and Italy. The EDC envisaged to create a 
European army which would operate under one European commander. However, uneasy with 
the idea of forging and alliance with the Europeans that it took rather lightly, and with a 
possible decoupling of NATO’s significance, the UK refused to join the EDC. What is 
interesting to note here is that indeed the United States was not in opposition to the EDC. As a 
matter of fact, the Americans thought that they can ensure a more secure Europe through the 
EDC, where the Europeans would bear a fair share of the burden (Ruggie,1997:112). On the 
other hand, the EDC plan was aborted in August 1954 when the French National Assembly 
vetoed the EDC Treaty. There were several reasons for this: First, the French were concerned 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 Western European Union Secretariat-General. 1998. Western European Union: A European Journey, p.11 
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of the creation of a European army without the British; it would be a futile effort without 
them. More importantly, British absence would give the Germans a dominant position within 
the EDC; the French were still skeptical towards the Germans. Another possibility for the 
EDC’s failure can be attributed to the fact that the Europeans were not yet ready to abandon a 
crucial aspect of their national security in exchange for an ambivalent common defense 
arrangement. 
  
However, eager to create some form of a security organization, the Europeans modified the 
Brussels Treaty of 1948, thus creating the Western European Union (WEU), which also 
included West Germany and Italy in 1955. West Germany’s accession to NATO occurred 
simultaneously with its WEU membership; a country with West Germany’s capabilities was 
too good an opportunity for NATO to be surpassed. These developments triggered parallel 
events in Eastern Europe; as an answer to NATO, the Communist bloc formed the Warsaw 
Pact in May 1955, an organization similar to NATO in terms of its scope.  
 
2.1.2 1955-1962: The Cold War Heats Up 
NATO’s flourishing in the 1950’s froze the WEU’s role as the security organization of 
Western Europe and caused it to become a mere consultative organ in matters of international 
affairs. When the Rome Treaty was signed in 1957, creating the EC, Europe diverted the bulk 
of its energy to economic integration, while the US bore the lion’s share in the defense and 
security of the continent vis-a-vis the Soviets. To test their relative strength, the Communist 
and Western blocs engaged each other in several parts around the world.  
 
In 1953, Dwight Eisenhower, the general who had led the Allies to victory in Western Europe 
became the President of the United States. Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster 
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Dulles, redressed the containment concept with “roll back”. Even though it was not a 
substantiated idea, it did find some unlucky audiences. Imre Nagy took office in Hungary in 
1956, replacing a Stalinist government. All seemed normal for a while, as Stalin had been 
long dead, and his successor Nikita Khrushchev appeared to be a much more receptive man 
than Stalin. Khrushchev embraced the ideas of “peaceful co-existence” with the West and 
“different roads to socialism” within the Communist camp. However, when the Hungarian 
government announced that it was going to hold free elections and withdraw from the 
Warsaw Pact, it was handled brutally by Moscow. As the armies of the Warsaw Pact rumbled 
through their land, the Hungarians awaited American intervention and roll back the Warsaw 
Pact. It never came and the Americans silently switched back to containment. Not only did 
the Hungarian crisis thawed the Americans of their limitations, it also showed how confined 
Khrushchev’s boasts were to lip service. It can be said that the invasion of Hungary depicted 
the extent to which the Europeans should rest their security in the hands of the United States. 
As it will be seen, one reason for forging a security identity for Europe owed to the skepticism 
towards the Americans (Ruggie,1997:119). 
 
The event which in one way affected the course of Europe’s security and defense outlook was 
the Suez Crisis of October 1956. Weary of Egypt’s policies against them for different 
motives, Israel, France and Britain attacked Egypt and overtook the Suez Canal. The event 
came as a great alarm to the Americans and the Soviets. Elections were coming up in the US 
and Eisenhower, who had appealed to his electorate as a man of peace, did not want to 
confront the Soviets due to Britain’s and France’s reckless adventure. The Soviets, on the 
other hand, were frustrated by what they saw as the resurfacing of imperialist intervention, 
although the real reason was the fact that Egypt had been the USSR’s client for a while. In the 
end, Britain and France withdrew from the Suez Canal and silently accepted the end of their 
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world power status. The Suez Crisis demonstrated to the two countries, especially to France, 
that they should be more prudent to limit their foreign policy actions to Europe, as they 
obviously seemed inadequate elsewhere. In this respect, France began to move forward with 
devising a new security concept for itself3.   
 
In 1961, John F. Kennedy replaced Eisenhower as president. His views on NATO were 
different from those of Eisenhower. While Eisenhower wanted to construct an autonomous 
nuclear consortium of Britain, France and West Germany and embraced massive nuclear 
retaliation as the Alliance’s doctrine against the Soviet threat4, Kennedy advocated the 
adoption of the flexible response doctrine. Under flexible response, the nuclear deterrent was 
to remain under the command of the US and nuclear retaliation was only going to be used 
when conventional means failed. Flexible response was essentially preserved until the end of 
the Cold War. 
 
During the 1960’s, the most important of the rows between the Americans and the Soviets 
was over Cuba. On the brink of US mainland, Cuba experienced a successful Communist 
revolution led by Fidel Castro in 1959, much to the alarm of the Americans. In order to 
reinstall a pro-American regime, the Americans planned and executed an uprising of Cuban 
exiles in April 1961, the renowned Bay of Pigs incident. The uprising failed and Castro 
retained his rule. In order to secure a stronghold in America’s backyard, the Soviets offered 
assistance on several matters to the Cubans. One aspect of this assistance was with the 
construction of missile sites in Cuba, to deter the US from trying an invasion once again. This 
time it was the Americans’ turn to be worried because the missiles had the capability of 
                                                          
3 As we shall see - also owing to Gaullism and the Cuban missile crisis – France became the first European ally 
to initiate an independent security outlook from that of the United States and it was this drive that really formed 
the basis of a separate security policy for the EU. 
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carrying nuclear warheads, and were too close for comfort. Realizing the urgency of the issue, 
President Kennedy immediately ordered the blockade of the island and asked Khrushchev to 
remove the missiles or that he would take necessary measures; in other words, he would 
invade the island – an action that would have probably escalated into nuclear exchange 
between the US and the Soviets. Khrushchev responded by asking the Americans to remove 
their missiles from Turkey. At first Kennedy refused, uncomfortable with the idea of 
complying with Soviet demands; it might mean that Washington would have to give way to 
Moscow’s demands from then on. On the other hand, tension was mounting and the Soviets 
were about to complete their missile program in Cuba; it was just a matter of days before the 
missiles were operational. In the end, however, Kennedy agreed to withdraw the American 
missiles from Turkey, as they were about to obsolesce anyhow, while the Soviets dismantled 
their missiles in Cuba. 
 
What was significant for the Europeans about the Cuban crisis in particular was that they 
were frightened of the possibility of being caught up in a confrontation between the 
Americans and the Soviets. Accordingly, they saw reason to differentiate between their 
security and foreign policy priorities from those of the Americans, if not split from them. Of 
course, this the Europeans never took to the full extent, but it was preferable for them to avoid 
sticking too much with the US. Moreover, the crisis also showed the Americans and the 
Soviets how dangerous their dealings with each other were and how close an all-out war 
between them was. It can be thought that the Cuban missile crisis was one of the prime 
motivators for the Kennedy administration to adopt flexible response, and it was the 
transformation to American predominance over NATO that resulted in France’s withdrawal 
from NATO’s integrated military structure. Once again, on the part of the Europeans, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
4 Ruggie, John Gerard. 1997. “Consolidating the European Pillar: The Key to NATO’s Future”. The Washington 
Quarterly, 20 (1): 109-124 
 52
independence of action from the Americans was sowed; it was not prudent to fall behind the 
Americans under any circumstances no matter what – the Cuban crisis showed that was just 
too dangerous for them. 
 
2.1.3 1963-1979: Europe Begins to Move: Gaullism, Détente, European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 
Invasion of Afghanistan 
In 1958, Charles de Gaulle took office as the French President. He had been resentful to the 
Americans for their patronizing attitude over NATO, and the British for their ties with the 
Americans. Accordingly, de Gaulle wanted to mould an independent French and European 
outlook to international affairs. To attain this, de Gaulle created an independent French 
nuclear deterrent, while conditioning British accession to the EC to Britain’s second its 
Atlantic ties. Unable to achieve this, de Gaulle blocked British entry to the Community in 
1961 and 1967. Meanwhile, he proposed to forge a common political outlook for the 
Community5, to no avail. As a result, he pulled France out of the integrated military command 
of NATO in 1966. As a matter of fact, to this day France remains outside the military wing of 
NATO. 
 
The Cuban missile crisis had demonstrated how inflammable the world was and how much 
Europe was in the frontline of a potential American-Soviet confrontation. Even though there 
was no way to the solve the grand issues between the Western and Soviet blocs, such as the 
ideological divide, there was some wisdom in addressing the more solvable ones, such as the 
question of Germany and disarmament. In this respect, the world witnessed what came to be 
known as détente, or relaxation. Germany, at Chancellor Willy Brandt’s initiative, also started 
working on an “Ostpolitik”, or “East policy”, in order to ease its tensions with its neighbors to 
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the East, particularly East Germany. In 1970, the West Germany signed a non-aggression pact 
with the USSR and Poland, recognizing the latter’s borders. This was the closest that West 
Germany came to normalizing its relations with its neighbors 25 years after the war. In 1971, 
the four powers of Berlin, namely the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union agreed on 
each other’s rights and duties over Berlin, thus, nothing like the Berlin blockade was to 
happen again. In 1972, East and West Germany signed the Basic Treaty, whereby they agreed 
to trade and exchange diplomatic missions. It was obvious that neither the Soviets nor the 
Americans were going to give up their part of Germany, so it was best for the Germans to 
reconcile their differences for the time being. Ostpolitik marked the disappearance of a 
significant point of conflict in Europe and for that reason gave the Europeans an 
understanding of the merits of engaging in diplomacy with their adversaries. More important 
than that, détente was overwhelmingly a European initiative and for this reason can be traced 
as an encouraging example for the Europeans  
 
In the light of the trend of détente in international affairs, and in hope to achieve a political 
common ground among themselves, members of the EC tried to move towards some form of 
political cooperation. It seemed imperative now that only the Europeans themselves can best 
address their concerns and common interests. It was the lack of a common foreign policy 
perspective amongst the Europeans that motivated them to create a common foreign policy. 
The Davignon report of 1970 was a significant step towards that direction. As it was 
mentioned, the report recommended regular meetings among EC foreign ministers, liaison 
among EEC ambassadors in foreign capitals, and common instructions for those ambassadors 
on certain issues. Accordingly, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established in 
October 1970. Of course, the EPC did not aim to replace NATO or American predominance 
in world affairs with a strictly European foreign policy but was a cooperative entity which set 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
5 Please refer to Chapter 1 on this point. 
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the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights as the common ground between 
members of the EC. The EPC was too premature to be a replacement for NATO, but 
moreover, it was an informal arrangement which was created as a separate organ from the EC, 
so as not to alienate some of the members that had stronger ties with the Americans, such as 
the Dutch and the West Germans. 
 
The first test of the EPC was between 1973 and 1975, when there was a Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the CSCE talks, the EPC managed to 
coordinate a united stance for the EC. In retrospect, it can be said that the EPC succeeded at 
the CSCE. The end result of the CSCE was in line with the guidelines of the EPC, which 
aimed at promoting human rights, democracy, and a more secure Europe. The CSCE 
produced the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which formalized the national borders in Europe, in 
other words, there was not going to be anymore border “readjustments” in Europe - one prime        
igniter of the Second World War. Also, the Act enabled a living space for non-governmental 
organizations (NGO’s) so that people could have more freedom in criticizing their 
governments, especially important in the Iron Curtain. Conducting a coherent foreign policy 
for the EC was a great success for the infant EPC process; it helped to secure a respectable 
status of an international actor for the EC.  
 
While the negotiations for the CSCE were underway, an Arab-Israeli war broke out in 
October 1973 and Turkey intervened in Cyprus in July 1974, due to deteriorating conditions. 
These two events happened to be a serious challenge to the EPC. The EPC put great effort to 
formulate a policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict to the common interest of its members, in 
order to prevent the Community members from taking a strictly pro-Israeli or pro-Arab 
preference. This was very important because there were divides between the approaches of 
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individual members towards the issue. For example, due to Gaullism, France abandoned its 
pro-Israeli approach after 1958 and had overtly supported the Arab cause in the Arab-Israeli 
war of July 1967 while Germany and the Netherlands retained a pro-Israeli approach. In 1973, 
however, the EC avoided such a dilemma, thanks to the EPC6. Even though the Arabs thought 
that the Europeans were putting their weight behind Israel for a while, they shifted their 
resentment to the Americans when the EEC issued a declaration, through the EPC, which 
addressed the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Furthermore, the EPC enhanced its 
proposals by establishing dialogue routes with the Arabs. At this point, the EPC sustained its 
first blow from the Americans, brushing them aside and seeing it against their interests that 
the Europeans pursue an independent policy, especially one that was pro-Arab. The American 
concern was that the Europeans would be involved in the Middle East in such a manner that 
their actions would be rendered incompatible. Following the Peace Accord between the 
Egyptians and the Israelis in 1979, the EC’s desire for a stronger endorsement of the 
Palestinian question weakened, as Egypt, one of its greatest promoters abandoned the Arab 
camp.  
 
The Cyprus crisis, which shall be covered extensively in the third chapter, broke out in July 
1974 when a pro-Greek coup overthrew the government. Determined to act to protect its vital 
interests and Turkish brethren, Turkey intervened in the island. By the end of August, Turkish 
forces were in control of forty percent of island, and the stature of the island’s administration 
was in question. The EPC had condemned the coup, underlining its support for Cyprus’ 
independence and territorial integrity. It also stated its opposition to any intervention or 
interference to mar this. Over time, unable to find a midway between its association 
commitments to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, as well with the re-establishment of democracy 
                                                          
6 Nuttal, Simon. “Two Decades of EPC Performance” in Regelsberger, Elfriede et. al. 1997. Foreign Policy of 
the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.25 
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in Greece and the new government’s EC application, the EPC failed to strike a balanced 
approach to the Cyprus question. The EC, through the EPC subsequently reverted to Greece’s 
position7. On the other hand, it did put stock into wisdom by amassing its support behind 
Britain during the crisis so that it could broker an agreement between the conflicting parties. 
 
 
Even though the EPC successfully coordinated Community foreign policy with the crisis of 
1973 and 1974, as well as during the CSCE, it was overwhelmed by the crisis in Afghanistan. 
Soviet forces invaded the country on Boxing Day in 1979. Many of the governmental offices 
in Europe were on a break, while the Community’s coordination bodies were not working. 
The Council Presidency was undergoing a transfer from Ireland to Italy, so there was 
confusion in coordinating Community policy as well. In January 1980, the foreign ministers’ 
meeting ended with a rather meek condemnation of the Soviet invasion. By February, 
however, the gravity of the situation became obvious and the EPC launched a diplomatic 
offensive to solve the issue. Once again, the Community saw the opportunity to demonstrate 
its creativity in addressing international matters. Their proposal involved the guarantee of 
permanent neutrality for Afghanistan, in exchange for Soviet withdrawal8. Even though the 
proposal was supported by the Third World and the Moslem countries, it was ignored by the 
Soviets who continued their operations in Afghanistan. Perhaps the proposal might have been 
more effective if the EPC mechanism intervened at the beginning of the conflict. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Indeed, as Greece attained EC membership in 1981, the EC’s stance regarding the Turkish-Greek dispute has 
been inevitably pro-Greek. 
8 Nuttal, Simon. “Two Decades of EPC Performance” in Regelsberger, Elfriede et. al. 1997. Foreign Policy of 
the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.30 
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2.1.4: 1980-1991: Towards the End of the Cold War 
The several crisis that the EPC tackled throughout the 1970’s confirmed the need to reform 
the EPC apparatus in order to better cope with world issues of significance to the Community. 
More pressing than this, there was the risk of heightening Cold War tensions. The invasion of 
Afghanistan ended the age of détente, an age of a reconciliation between the Soviet and the 
Western blocs. President Ronald Reagan took office in the United States in 1981, and did not 
trust the Soviets due to the invasion of Afghanistan. Accordingly, he did away with the 
disarmament commitments and started an arms race with the Soviets. In Europe, the question 
of reviving the WEU was brought forward by France as it already had an independent foreign 
policy agenda from the US since 1966. Adding atop traditional French skepticism towards 
NATO, the 1980’s saw the risk of returning to pre-détente arrangements, where both the 
United States and the Soviet Union started amassing arms into Europe, especially short and 
intermediate range nuclear weapons, much to the alarm of the Europeans. Concerns were 
enhanced because no one on the European continent wanted to be at the center of a US-Soviet 
confrontation. Hence, it became apparent that the states in Western Europe needed to address 
their own security concerns through institutions that were predominantly European. 
 
In addition to growing concerns by the Europeans towards the Soviet-American arms race, the 
EC members learned from their mistakes and short-comings from their experiences in the 
1970’s. After extensive deliberations, the Community agreed on the London Report in 
October 1981. With this report, a Troika Secretariat, which later became the formalized EPC 
Secretariat under the Single European Act, was established so that the current, preceding and 
succeeding European Council presidents would enable the smooth transform of the 
Community’s foreign policy issues. Before the Troika institution, the incoming and outgoing 
Council presidents had to transfer many agenda to each other, causing significant gaps in the 
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EPC’s functioning. With the Troika structure, the preceding president would continue 
working on the issues that it was already overlooking, such as accession negotiations or trade 
agreements, and in the mean time, gradually hand over its workload to its successors and 
inform them on the issues.  
 
The new reforms and the Troika Secretariat lost face initially with the crisis in Poland in 
1981, but then recovered. Just as they were endeavoring to consolidate their new 
implementation methods, martial law was announced in Poland against a freedom movement, 
the Solidarity, which had been gaining public support for a while. Stuck between the boycott 
calls from the US on the one hand, and its eagerness to save as much as détente and Ostpolitik 
as possible, the EPC was paralyzed. However, a breakthrough did come by mid-January when 
the imposition of sanctions to the Soviet Union and Poland was passed by the Council, at the 
recommendation of the EPC procedure. This was the first significant tangible action of the EC 
and the EPC regarding the implementation of a foreign policy. 
 
Another tangible action the EPC took was with the invasion of the Falkland Islands by 
Argentina in April 1982, as it should have, since it was British territory. This time there was 
no hesitation, unlike in Poland, over what sorts of policy tools to be used. Almost at once, the 
Community imposed sanctions and froze credits to Argentina, while the British cause was 
supported by the members at the United Nations. It was the first time that the EPC 
significantly succeeded in forging a common European position towards events – on time. 
 
Finally, the turning point of the Cold War came towards the end of 1985 when Mikhail 
Gorbachev was elected to the office of Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. Gorbachev declared a unilateral force reduction to demonstrate his resolution to 
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attain a more secure Europe. Gorbachev’s move was received positively by many Europeans, 
who were fed up with their frontline status and the Cold War. Accordingly, there was great 
resentment and reaction to the plans to upgrade NATO’s short and intermediate range nuclear 
arsenal, as well as to the utilization of nuclear weapons as a deterrent by both sides. 
Nevertheless, Gorbachev’s initiatives received a great deal of support from the public opinion 
in Europe, who urged their governments to reach an understanding with the Soviets. There 
was interest on the part of the Americans to the Soviets’ proposal as well. Thus, what came to 
be known as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) began with the Reagan-Gorbachev 
summit in Iceland in October 1986. More like a reinvigoration of the SALT, START aimed to 
significantly reduce the number of the nuclear weapons the US and the USSR possessed. 
Even though the START process is still in progress and there remains much to be done to 
reduce the leverage of nuclear weapons in the world, discussing issues at the negotiating table 
appeared to have a very strong symbolic meaning to the Cold War – it was possible to address 
differences through reconciliation rather than confrontation. 
 
Even though the EPC appeared to be functional, and even though it was formalized with the 
Single European Act, there was an ever-growing concern to revive the WEU because the EPC 
remained a cooperative institution and was inadequate at a time when there was a good deal 
of ease of tensions. It was important to see that the Soviets were not intending to stay in 
Europe forever, or at least not the way that they had throughout the Cold War, and that the 
Europeans had to address the security of their territories themselves. Thus, members of the 
WEU assembled a council of foreign and defense ministers in 1984 and started questioning 
what use they can be to provide for the security of Europe. The suggestion was that there was 
a need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, and that the WEU has to bear that role. 
Moreover, meeting at the Hague in 1987, the EC understood that neglecting defense and 
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security issues was always going to mean that a dimension of European integration was going 
to be missing9. In order to start getting used to the idea of concerted action, the WEU 
executed a modest minesweeping operation in the Persian Gulf in 1988. Even though it was a 
fairly symbolic operation, it not only demonstrated the WEU’s resolve to administer a 
common European perception of security in the light of the common interests of Europe, but 
also set the scope of the operations that the Europeans were to cover in the following decade. 
   
Gorbachev’s approach to the internal affairs of the Iron Curtain turned out to be as important 
as his pursuit of Soviet foreign policy. During his term, he endorsed what was called glasnost 
and perestroika (openness and reconstruction) to treat the Soviet system’s inertial nature. 
More than curing the Communist system’s malfunctions, glasnost and perestroika showed the 
people of the Iron Curtain that they had been living under an illusion which made think that 
they were the ones better off than the Westerners. Thus, with growing resentment to their 
governments, the year 1989 saw the mass movements in Eastern Europe and the demise of the 
Soviet Union’s satellites. Transitional governments, with the aim of holding free and 
competitive elections, were formed and now it was almost certain that the Cold War was over. 
The following year, the NATO summit in London welcomed the developments in Europe 
while stressing the importance of enhancing the role for Europe within the Atlantic Alliance. 
 
Before the Cold War was over, a major crisis erupted in August 1990, when Iraq attacked 
Kuwait. It was an unexpected event and caught the Community by surprise. With the 
initiative of the United States, an international coalition was assembled, which also included 
many European armies, and defeated Iraq in February 1991. The Gulf War demonstrated that 
in the new unipolar world order, where the USA was going to be the hegemon of international 
affairs, Europe was still very far away from having the necessary mechanisms to pursue 
                                                          
9 Western European Union Secretariat-General. 1998. Western European Union: A European Journey, p.86 
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objective in line with its interests. The Gulf War demonstrated that even though the EC was 
an “economic giant”, it was also a “political dwarf”, but worst of all, a “military worm”10. The 
incompetence of the EC and the EPC was addressed in the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, covered 
in the previous chapter. 
 
2.2 Security in Europe in the Post-Cold War Era 
In December 1991, the hammer and the sickle was not flying over the Kremlin anymore; it 
was replaced with the flag of the Russian Federation, marking the official end of the Cold 
War. With the Cold War over, there were questions regarding the necessity of NATO, since 
the Soviet threat was gone. As the Soviet threat during the Cold War was much more pressing 
than individual countries’ interests, differences within the Western Alliance were muted. 
Thus, the Western Europeans, a good deal of which were united under the umbrella of the 
European Union already, pointed out to the need to restructure European security, with the 
United States and other non-EU members, through the WEU, with what was known as the 
European Security and Defense Identity/Policy (ESDI/ESDP). The identity of NATO 
throughout the Cold War was the delivery of security to its members against the Communist 
threat, in other words, its identity was anti-Communist; since Communism was gone, what 
was going to be the identity of Europe’s security? For this, Europe had to reconsider its 
identity and it was the ESDP’s mission to redress Europe’s identity as a security and defense 
focal point. For one thing, the EU did accord itself an identity; as it was seen with the 
Copenhagen criteria, the EU aimed to establish a space where human rights and democracy 
were upheld, as well as a competitive market economy. Thus, it was the generation of this 
new identity of Europe in the post-Cold War era that defined the new Europe and what ought 
to be protected in that respect. 
 
                                                          
10 Statement made by Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens in New York Times, January 25, 1991. 
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In parallel with the ESDP, the European Union set the goal to mould a common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP) for its needs. It is important for the aim of this thesis to clarify one 
point: the ESDI/ESDP is not necessarily the same thing with the CFSP. Even though they are 
very interrelated, the CFSP is a strictly intra-EU arrangement, while the ESDP is a concept 
that attempts to address the security concerns of Europe as a whole, not just those of the EU. 
Accordingly, there can be, and indeed have been, completely different proposals for the 
forging of the ESDP; an American perception of an ESDP, a Turkish perception of an ESDP, 
and, of course, an EU perception of ESDI in line with its CFSP. In this respect, the ESDP can 
be said to be more of a process than an institution, unlike the CFSP. 
 
2.2.1 New Challenges to Stability in Europe 
Several new challenges emerged for the stability and security of Europe with the demise of 
the Cold War structure. The rise of these new challenges owed a great deal to the environment 
of certainty created by the Cold War; the threat was clear and present, and for that reason was 
much more predictable and deterrable. Moreover, the costs of escalating tension was 
dangerously high, and for that reason, there was less room for provocation and crisis. With 
that certainty gone, the world faced a number of immediate crisis, as well as potential risks, 
all of which urged the EU and other institutions involved in the security of Europe to 
reconsider their roles in the new era. 
 
2.2.1.1 The Gulf War  
As it was mentioned, the Gulf Crisis of August 1990, followed by the Gulf War of 1991, 
demonstrated the short-comings of Europe to address its security concerns. Indeed, Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait did come as a surprise to all major powers of the world; on the other hand, 
it was not the European Union, but the United States that liberated Kuwait, even though it is 
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much more distant to the region than Europe. Had it not been for the US, Iraq would have 
controlled roughly a fifth of the world’s oil supplies, leaving the world, but especially Europe 
due to its dependence on Middle East oil more than anyone, to the mercy of Iraq. It was this 
factor that woke the EU from its dormant state as a security institution and made it question 
its role in this new era. 
 
2.2.1.2 Former Yugoslavia 
A second event that shocked the Europeans was the ethnic violence that broke up in former 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia disintegrated when its constituent republics broke up from the 
Yugoslav Federation in 1991. Almost immediately fighting broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
between Bosniacs, Serbs and Croats, because of the deep-rooted antagonisms between the 
different ethnicities. This time right at its brink, a humanitarian catastrophe challenged the 
EU. The EU response was docile, confining itself to cargo checks and cease-fire monitoring, 
as it did not have the willingness, rather than the capabilities to do more than that. The 
fighting in Bosnia stopped with the Dayton Accord in November 1995 and just as in the Gulf 
War, fighting was stopped with American diplomatic and military intervention. The EU once 
again failed to provide for the stability of Europe and demonstrated its reliance on the US. 
 
A few years later, another humanitarian crisis emerged in former Yugoslavia in mid-1998, 
this time in the province of Kosovo. The Belgrade government was forcing ethnic Albanians, 
who had an overwhelming majority in the province, to emigrate with atrocious methods. 
Again it was the military power of the United States that stopped the Yugoslav government 
from carrying out the extermination and deportation of Kosovar Albanians. This time with 
more commitment to solution, the EU, through the member states’ armies, took over the 
peace-keeping in Kosovo, implementing for the first time a Petersberg task genuinely 
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2.2.1.3 Terrorism and Organized Crime 
With the end of the Cold War, organized crime networks have taken up the lacunae created by 
the weakening of state structures, especially in the former Soviet Union. These networks have 
emerged as important centers of gravity, working on a wide range of activities; drug 
trafficking, alien trafficking, arms smuggling, prostitution and quite likely smuggling 
weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union (Algieri,1996:194). In that 
respect, the danger with organized crime is that it is becoming a locus of economic power, 
threatening to establish itself in those countries as a center of power, possibly replacing state 
authority11. 
 
The significance of organized crime to the subject of European security owes to its relation 
with terrorism. The revenue that organized crime activities generate is colossal and this has 
been used to fund the operations of terrorist organizations12. Accordingly, organized crime, 
which normally falls under the jurisdiction of the third pillar of the EU, is also a threat to the 
Union’s security. Terrorist organizations use the above-mentioned activities to fund their 
operations and this gives them significant leverage against the states that they run against. 
Even though the EU has not been as vulnerable to terrorism as much as say, Turkey and the 
United States, it is not totally immune from terrorism. In this respect, it has to be said that 
terrorism is being paid greater attention in Europe, along with organized crime, in the past 
decade; this is the reason why the Europol is actualized. In this respect, organized crime is 
well-rooted in Europe and it cannot be certain when its Siamese-twin, terrorism, will come to 
collect its toll from Europe. Thus, it will be prudent for the EU to address the question of 
terrorism and organized crime within the realm of the second pillar. 
                                                          
11 Strange, Susan. 1995. “The Limits of Politics”, Government and Opposition, 30(3): 291-311 
12 Yılmaz, Halil. 1998. “Türkiye’de Organize Suç”, Turkish Journal of Police Studies, 1(1):73-85 
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2.2.1.4 Resurfacing of Nationalism 
The greatest fear during the early years of the post-Cold War era was the possibility of the 
return of nationalist tendencies in Europe, doing away with European integration 
(Pinder,1998:19). On the other hand, as it was argued in the previous chapter, the benefits of 
European integration have proven too great to abandon for any country involved in the 
process. Accordingly, economic integration and political cooperation was brought to the point 
where a reversal of the direction of European integration was not possible.  
 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the creation of a CFSP is especially important because the 
convergence of foreign and security policy-making among EU members can prevent them 
from disintegrating. The forging of a CFSP for Europe and perhaps a common European 
defense policy can tie the EU similar in essence to that of a Gordian knot which would be not 
only unthinkable, but also impossible to break. 
 
2.2.2 New Institutions For a New Era 
As it was stated before, many questioned the need for NATO following the Cold War 
(Walt,1997:156). As there was an no more an important security threat similar to that of the 
Soviet Union, there was no need to retain NATO, the argument run. Even though it was true 
that NATO’s Article 5 became less relevant over time, the preferred path became the 
preservation of NATO while creating and flourishing other institutions in cooperation with 
NATO. To complement NATO, several institutions were created or revived for retaining 
security and peace in Europe. 
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2.2.2.1 The WEU  
In December 1991, new roles were recommended for the WEU at the Maastricht summit of 
the EC. The WEU was to be developed as the security and defense component of the 
European Union and the European pillar of NATO13. A few months later, in June 1992, the 
WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Petersberg set the scope of the organization’s 
operations; anti-terrorism, humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat tasks in crisis 
management, as well as peacemaking. These operations came to be known as the Petersberg 
tasks. Hence, the WEU was to cover all aspects of security of Europe, with the exception of 
NATO’s defense clause under Article 5; defense remained NATO’s responsibility to its 
members. Meanwhile, the WEU’s membership statute was changed: all countries which were 
the members of NATO and/or the EU were invited to join the WEU. Greece acquired full 
membership status; Turkey, Norway, Iceland, which were NATO allies but not EU members 
were to become associate members; the Observers were those EU members that were not 
NATO members, Ireland at first, and later Finland, Sweden and Austria when they joined the 
EU in 1995 (although Denmark was a NATO member, it was very hesitant and skeptical 
towards the WEU and the EU’s second pillar, and for this reason has not sought full 
membership status with the WEU). In retrospect, it can be said that the WEU not only became 
the European pillar of NATO, but also the EU’s second pillar. As a matter of fact, in 2002, the 
WEU did merge with the EU under the office of the High Representative of the CFSP. This 
point needs to be borne in mind as the EU now has all the WEU organs under its control – an 
important factor for the credibility of its CFSP. 
 
In accordance with the Petersberg tasks, France and Germany created a joint army corps, the 
Eurocorps, in 1992, to execute possible operations. The Eurocorps was a 35,000-man task 
force at first and later was upgraded to a 60,000-man force with the participation of some of 
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the other members of the WEU. Further on, it was agreed in the European Council in Helsinki 
in December 1999 to form a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to intervene under the Petersberg 
tasks, and for that reason the Eurocorps was to become the RRF. In other words, the RRF is 
the EU army under the auspices of the second pillar, in charge to carry out operations in line 
with the Petersberg tasks. 
  
Also under the WEU, a Planning Cell was made operational in April 1993, in order to 
coordinate and form contingency plans with member states’ military staff. To support these 
plans with real-time intelligence, a Satellite Center was established in Spain. An orbital 
surveillance system is developed so as to give reliable information for the planning of 
possible Petersberg operations. Another institution under the endorsement of the WEU was 
the West European Armaments Group, which aimed to develop a European armaments 
agency, responsible to oversee the standardization of the incompatible weapons systems 
within the armed forces of the WEU, as well as to enforce various disarmament agreements.  
 
At the NATO summit in January 1994, in order to aid the WEU, the Combined Joint Task 
Forces (CJTF) mechanism was installed to give the WEU’s Petersberg operations viability. 
During the Cold War, NATO forces in Europe were under the command of the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), under a four-star American general, keeping 
an eye on the Soviets. With the CJTF mechanism, NATO attained more flexibility to help the 
WEU execute operations under the provisions of the Petersberg tasks and the Maastricht 
Treaty. What is very remarkable about the CJTF is that even though its specific missions had 
to be approved by NATO on a case-by-case basis, it also allowed the contributions from non-
NATO and/or non-EU members; in other words, a country that is neither a NATO nor an EU 
member, willing to join an operation under the Petersberg tasks, could do so if the WEU sees 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
13 Western European Union Secretariat-General. 1998. Western European Union: A European Journey, p.109 
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it fit. This has been helpful to enhance cooperation in the post-Cold War era between Russia, 
the primary successor to the Soviet Union and the West, once the bitter enemies of a past age.  
 
The CJTF worked as such: NATO forces that were separable but not separate were made 
answerable to the WEU. If the WEU needed to carry out an operation that was outside the 
scope of NATO’s responsibility, it would have access to NATO assets, with the consent of 
the NATO Council. This mechanism helped both the WEU and NATO address the new 
security problems in Europe after the Cold War with much greater efficiency. For example, 
the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (IFOR) is carried out under the CJTF mechanism, at 
least on paper, while in fact it is under American command (Ruggie,1997). On the other hand, 
the CJTF mechanism has demonstrated its uses by giving a more flexible outlook to the 
security of Europe and enhancing cooperation on operations which are not under the 
traditional responsibilities of NATO. 
 
As it was mentioned, the WEU has merged with the EU. Thus, the EU is moving forward to 
establish its own security capabilities. What is especially interesting about the CJTF is that it 
really was not NATO capabilities that the WEU sought to have access to, but American 
military assets14. It was the Europeans’ reliance on the Americans over military  such as 
intelligence-gathering, long-range heavy airlifting, and air-refueling capabilities15. In 
accordance, the RRF is going to be organized in such  a way that it will enable the EU to act 
independently from the United States in the future, and it is imperative that the CFSP address 
such deficiencies on its own, if it is to attain that independence. On the other hand, this has 
created certain problems with non-EU member NATO allies. The problem is that the EU’s 
Petersberg operations can occur in the proximity of a given NATO member, without that 
                                                          
14 Gordon, Philip H. 1997. “Does the WEU Have a Role?”, The Washington Quarterly, 20 (1), p. 132 
15 ibid, p. 133 
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country having a say over it. To remedy this problem, the EU has promised to establish 
increased consultations with that non-EU member if it carries an operation in a place that 
might affect the country in question16. On the other hand, the problem of being excluded from 
the EU can have further repercussions for NATO allies, especially Turkey, altering these 
countries’ security considerations in the near future17. 
 
2.2.2.2 The Enlarged NATO 
Following the Cold War, it was very appealing for Warsaw Pact countries, such as Poland and 
Hungary, to opt for NATO membership, in particular due to a possible re-emergence of 
Russian antagonism. Moreover, NATO membership was argued to also mark the approval of 
these countries’ status as a Western state (Arnold,1997:46). In order to increase the security of 
former Warsaw Pact countries, the question of NATO membership was opened to prospective 
CEEC’s. On the other hand, NATO enlargement met stiff opposition from Russia. As 
enlargement aimed to pre-empt possible Russian military action in Eastern Europe in the near 
future, it also posed the risk to create a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is to say that it ran the 
risk of forcing Russia to re-attain an adverse character to the West. Indeed, during the process 
of enlargement Russia did threaten that it will seek a revived version of the Warsaw Pact with 
some of the former Soviet republics if a NATO enlargement alienating it to the West is 
pushed forward. On the other hand, this did not turn out to be the case. In order to 
accommodate Russia’s doubts, NATO improved the Partnership for Peace (PfP) arrangement, 
which was formed in 1991 in order to solve the security problems of the world following the 
Cold War, and molded the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This new organ turned 
                                                          
16 Even though not yet publicized, it is believed that this is the crux of the Ankara Agreement signed between 
Turkey, Britain and the United States in December 2001 regarding the conduct of operations of the RRF. 
17 In Turkey’s case, there is also the risk of being excluded from the West when thinking about its exclusion 
from the EU. On Turkey’s identity dilemma with the EU, please refer to Müftüler-Baç, Meltem and Gülnur 
Aybet. Autumn 2000. “Transformations in Security and Identity After the Cold War”. International Journal, pp: 
567-582 
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out to be important because it was through this pattern that NATO became a non-Article 5 
partner of NATO. It was at the EAPC that former enemies started to consult and cooperate on 
the security issues of the new era, such as arms control, peacekeeping, civil emergency 
planning, and terrorism18. 
 
2.2.3 New Perceptions For a New Era 
With the collapse of Cold War arrangements, new concerns were raised for the security of 
Europe and different perceptions on attaining security were developed by involving parties, 
especially in the light of the outlined new challenges of the new era.  Of those perceptions, the 
EU perception, the American perception and the Russian perception are the most relevant 
ones because it is primarily these parties’ preferences that are going to affect the outcome of 
international affairs in the following years.    
 
2.2.3.1 The European Union and the Second Pillar 
One of the greatest problems for the EU after the Gulf War was the War’s demonstration of 
how weak Europe on its own was19. Even though it was completely dependent on the stable 
flow of Middle East oil, the EU failed to act as an important political entity, lest a military 
power during the Gulf War. It was the Gulf War that came as a wake up call for the EU to 
start doing something about its insufficiency in the field of security.  
 
Further on, the ethnic conflict that broke out in former Yugoslavia worsened EU’s credibility 
as a succinct European organization. On the other hand, it can be argued that the case of 
Yugoslavia proved to be a good instructor to the EU for its short-comings. The ethnic strife in 
                                                          
18 http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/part-coop.htm 
19 Please recall Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens’ remark on Page 61. 
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Bosnia and Kosovo were guidelines as to how and where the EU should be cautious regarding 
the security of the continent.  
 
As it was seen in the preceding section, the EU, through the WEU, wished to have access to 
NATO, i.e. US, military capabilities to conduct possible Petersberg tasks. On the other hand, 
this turned out to be very hard for the EU to rely on because access to NATO capabilities was 
only granted on a case-by-case and that this was going to be a dangerous setback to EU’s 
operations should a NATO member (and a non-EU member) decline to approve EU access. 
On that account, the EU has gradually started moving away from NATO and the United 
States in quest for its security. Furthermore, as time moved on, the European Union has begun 
questioning its confinement to Petersberg tasks. France, as we have seen, was always 
advocating the creation of an autonomous, if not independent, European security structure 
even during the Cold War; with the end of the Cold War, France began pushing the 
development of an ESDP independent from that of the United States. Also, ethnic conflict in 
former Yugoslavia and American involvement there, at the impotence of the EU, came as a 
great shock. Inversely, it was not for granted that the United States would always come to 
Europe’s help every time it required; it was about time that the Europeans bore some of the 
burden themselves. In 1998, with Britain now under a Labor government, hence less skeptical 
to the EU’s security and defense identity, France declared at the St.Malo Conference that it 
was the EU’s duty to play its leading role in the international scene. To that end, the EU was 
urged to have the capacity for autonomous action from NATO, should it not be willing to act, 
backed up by a credible military force, and above all, the willingness on the part of the EU to 
use that force for international crises20. 
 
                                                          
20 Schake, Kori, Amaya Bloch-Laine and Charles Grant. 1999. “Building a European Defence Capability”. 
Survival, 41 (1): 20-40 
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In order to avoid a return to the pre-integration epoch, the enlargement of the EU to Central 
and Eastern Europe was also pushed for, so as to give the CEEC’s a well-deserved carrot to 
avoid nationalist tendencies. Several programs, most notably PHARE21, endeavored to assist 
Iron Curtain countries restructure their economies in line with the free market economy so as 
to integrate these countries to the European Union and the international economic system.  
Also, prior to the St.Malo Conference, the EU did find it reasonable to extend NATO 
membership to some of the countries of the former Iron Curtain, so as to deepen their sense of 
belonging to the West. Even though the EU is separating itself from NATO, it sees point to 
support NATO enlargement to the CEEC’s perhaps because it feels the need to have the 
Americans and NATO in charge until the EU itself is ready to assume responsibility.  
 
2.2.3.2 Russia 
In April 2002, Russia became a non-Article 5 NATO member, in other words, it became a 
NATO member but was exempted from the Article 5 commitments of the Alliance. 
Nonetheless, this did not come as a natural event. Russia’s stance vis-a-vis the rest of Europe 
was somewhat ambivalent after the Cold War and it was questioned to what extend Russia 
can become democratic and friendly(Kastl,1997). Some intellectuals argued that a 
“congagement” policy (containment plus engagement) had to be adapted in order to show 
Russia the sticks and carrots for being friendly on the one hand, and antagonistic on the 
other(Khalilzad,2000:89-93). 
 
Right at the end of the Cold War, there was much enthusiasm on the part of both Russia and 
the West for Russian-Western rapprochement. On the other hand, the honeymoon finished too 
early as Russia was bogged down in a much disputed ethnic conflict in Chechnya, which 
broke out in 1994. Ethnically and culturally different from mainstream Russian society, the 
                                                          
21 Pologne-Hongorie: Actions pour la Reconversion Economique-phare also means lighthouse in French. 
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Chechens, who were living under an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation, 
opted for independence. Due to the human rights violations committed, Russia was seriously 
condemned in the international community, creating unease in the West for Russia’s post-
Cold War identity. Concerned of possible Russian pressures over Eastern Europe, the West 
sought to enlarge NATO to Eastern Europe so as to intimidate Russia from doing something 
similar here for whatever reason. Owing to these factors, Russian-Western relations lost their 
initial momentum during the second half of the 1990’s. 
 
As with NATO expansion and the EU, because NATO was a residue of the Cold War, it was 
disliked by Russian public opinion and there was considerable skepticism towards NATO 
expansion22. On the other hand, Russia welcomed convergence with the EU and EU 
enlargement, while public opinion surveys demonstrated that Russians would prefer an EU 
intervention rather than a NATO intervention to a hypothetical crisis in the former Soviet 
republics23, due to the fact that NATO symbolized their defeat in the Cold War. Thus, it can 
be said that Russia has been supportive of the enhancement of the ESDP and the CFSP, due to 
its support and prospective membership of the EU. 
 
As time went by, President Boris Yeltsin, who ruled Russia since 1990, was replaced in 2001 
by a more realist and receptive Vladimir Putin. Since Putin’s rise to power, tension in 
Chechnya has relatively eased although has not died down, and Russia’s convergence with the 
West, through various institutions, has enhanced, improving the security in Europe. In this 
sense, Western-Russian security dealings have improved to the extent that Russia has become 
a NATO partner, but not yet an ally. Thus, this is the reason why Russia is not labeled as a 
potential security for the European Union. 
                                                          
22 Kay, Sean. 1998. NATO and the Future of European Security. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, pp.89-97 
23 ibid.  
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2.2.3.3 The United States 
The former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had once complained of not having 
someone on the other side of the phone when he wanted to talk with someone representing 
Europe. In this respect, the United States was always supportive of a European integration and 
Europe’s deepening, especially after the Cold War. On the other hand, it did not wish to see a 
drift between itself and Europe. Europe is very important for American national interests and 
has presented itself as an important springboard for US foreign-policy actions in the Eurasian 
land mass (Brzezinski,1997). Also,  
Without America, Europe turns into a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find 
equilibrium, much less unity... Without Europe, America will become an island off the shores 
of Eurasia condemned to a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its 
national genius24. 
 
On the other hand, some scholars are warning that a split between the US and the EU is going 
to be inevitable at one future point for several reasons (Walt,1997): first, the US is going to 
look at the more problematic regions of the world, such as Asia and the Pacific basin. Thus, it 
will be a matter of time for the Europeans to bear full responsibility for their own security and 
defense. Second, and more importantly, the two parties can be said to have conflicting views 
on the conduct of international affairs. The problem of the EU-US split is important to 
mention. Due to its unchallenged power, the United States has tended to act more unilaterally 
in the last few years. There exists a significant divide between the EU and the US when it 
comes to tackling issues; especially in the field of international security, while the EU 
advocates the utilization of several different tools, such as diplomacy and sanctions to solve 
the issues, the US is more simplistic in its approach, that is, more keen on cutting with the 
rubbish talk and skipping to action. This point has become very obvious with the question of 
how to handle Iraq after the Gulf War. While the US warns that it is impatient to unilaterally 
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attack Iraq if the latter does not comply with UN resolutions regarding the weapons 
inspections, the EU advocates a much more law-bounded approach to the question in Iraq and 
the possible ease of sanctions for Iraq. A possible third reason for the Euro-American rupture 
might be attributed to the events after September 11th 2001. In the light of the September 11th 
incident, it is obvious that America’s immediate security concern has switched to terrorism 
from an armed attack by a hostile to the US or an ally. For this reason, in the course following 
September 11th, the US will address its security concerns outside Europe and will likely 
reduce its security commitments in Europe, compelling the EU to create its own security 
policy. 
 
The re-structuring of European security has come about with American input and reactions. 
Even though supportive of European integration, the United States was rather suspicious 
towards the idea of the Europeanization of European security, until mid-1980’s. With the Gulf 
War, it was understood that it was not Europe that posed a security threat to American 
interests, but the so-called “rouge” states that act unpredictably, like Iraq in 1990. 
Accordingly, the United States began to downsize its forces in Europe and started to pay 
greater attention to strengthen the European pillar in NATO, so that the US could look 
elsewhere. Moreover, the US still bears the unproportionate share of Western security, 
accordingly, it also has well-founded economic reasons to encourage EU’s CFSP, which 
might eventually ease the burden on American defense budget. 
 
With the ESDP and CFSP projects, the US warned Europe of avoiding decoupling NATO’s 
capabilities, the unnecessary duplication of capabilities thus creating inefficiency and 
avoiding discrimination to NATO allies that are not EU members. In all these respects, it can 
be said that the US has been concerned about the extent of the CFSP, because it might 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
24 Kisinger, Henry. “Expand NATO Now”, Washington Post, December 19, 1994.  
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undermine Europe’s dependence on American power and as a result, enable Europe to act 
more freely than the US, undermining its objectives in Europe and its proximity. On the other 
hand, the US has welcomed the EU’s attainment of a security dimension as it hopes that this 
will ease the burden on its back in defending and securing Europe. 
 
In retrospect, one question throughout the Cold War was whether the United States was 
sincere to sacrifice its own security when that of Europe was at stake (Ruggie,1997:119). 
How willing was the US to risk New York City, Chicago, or Los Angeles to protect Paris, 
Rome, or London? In a way, the CFSP and the WEU demoted such fears by committing 
Rome to Paris, Paris to Berlin, Berlin to London, and so on, the argument runs, in case the 
Americans ever abandoned Europe. On the other hand, there were incidents where NATO 
commitments were put aside, amidst the Cold War. As a matter of history and to fortify this 
point, NATO guarantees explicitly failed in 1963 with a letter that US President Lyndon 
Johnson sent to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, which stated that Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty will not be put into action if Turkey decided to intervene to the crisis in 
Cyprus and faced military action by the USSR. So, it can be argued that there was always 
reason for European suspicions towards the US over its security guarantees and that it was 
wise for them not to put that to the test. In this respect, EU’s forging of a CFSP is important 
so as not to rely on the unpredictable American factor. 
 
On the other hand, if there were doubts against America’s sincerity on its commitments 
towards Europe’s peace and security, they have been cast aside with the crises in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. Indeed, as Lord George Robertson, former British Secretary of Defense and current 
NATO Secretary-General, admitted that the Europeans’ ineptitude in solving the crisis in 
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Yugoslavia was a shame25. In this sense, as it was mentioned before, one of the prime 
motivator’s for the EU towards establishing a CFSP with a credible military force was ignited 
by the ethnic tragedy in former Yugoslavia. In this sense, Europe’s emergence as an 
international actor with a credible military force cannot be attained by confronting or 
resenting the US, but by cooperating with it. Hence, it is not so easy for either party to 
abandon one another; especially when their interests converge to such an extent. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
The current CFSP of the EU did not emerge out of nowhere. With the start of the Cold War in 
1947 with the Truman Doctrine, there was concern among the Americans and their allies 
regarding the Soviet Union’s hostile intentions. Accordingly, they carved various 
organizations, such as the Brussels Treaty Organization in 1948, which later became the 
Western European Union (WEU) in 1955, and most importantly the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 1949, in order to increase their collective security vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union. It was these two organizations that formed the basis of the CFSP of the EU. 
 
With the end of the Cold War, new security challenges emerged in Europe. The biggest of the 
challenges was what to do with NATO, an institution that was created to respond to the needs 
of the Cold War. As time went by, it was thought better to give NATO a flexible outlook to 
address Europe’s new security concerns while strengthening the EU’s and the WEU’s role in 
that respect. Accordingly, the Petersberg tasks were set as the jurisdiction of Europe’s new 
security architecture: while NATO was to remain the defense organization protecting its 
members from an outside attack through its Article 5, it was the EU, through the WEU and its 
CFSP, that was given the tasks of covering policy areas other than Article 5. Also, security 
                                                          
25 Kraus, Doris. “Interview with Lord Robertson”, Die Presse, December 16 1999.  
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threats such as ethnic conflict, terrorism and organized crime, and stable energy sources 
pushed the EU to formulate a CFSP for itself. 
 
The CFSP has aimed to provide for the security of the continent through tasks which are not 
covered by NATO’s jurisdiction. This may be attributed to the fact that NATO was devised in 
order to approach the security considerations of the Cold War. As the Cold War is long over, 
the EU is working on a CFSP and an army corps to support its policies. It is the well-
functioning of this arrangement that is quite importantly going to decide whether Europe will 
be as stable as it was during the Cold War. What is even more important regarding the EU’s 
rise as a security actor following the Cold War is that it is creating a supranational political 
entity with a clear security outlook. This is important for Europe as it lived under the 
protective shield of the United States and now that the rationale of that shield is gone, is 
endeavoring to cover for its lack of a security perspective. As it was argued in the previous 
chapter, the question of forging a CFSP will be a great challenge for European integration as a 
process. Further on, the possibility of a drift between the EU and the US will be determined to 
what extent the CFSP succeeds and to what extent the two parties’ security priorities converge 
or diverge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TURKEY AND THE SECOND PILLAR 
 
The last chapter of the thesis looks at Turkey's convergence/divergence with the EU in the 
realm of the EU’s second pillar, and this convergence/divergence’s implications for Turkey’s 
accession to the EU. What will the EU and Turkey respectively gain and lose if they are to 
commit to one another’s foreign and security policies and what are the obstacles and igniters 
for this commitment. Moreover, Turkey’s EU membership would be a milestone in its drive 
towards the West, significantly altering Turkey’s future; this chapter will endeavor to assess 
how the question of the CFSP affects that end.  
 
Turkey’s accession to the EU has implications not only for Turkey and the EU, but also to the 
United States, which has been one of the most ardent supporters of Turkish accession to the 
EU, hoping to permanently anchor Turkey to the West. On the other hand, with the possibility 
of the chasm between the US and the EU discussed in the previous chapter growing even 
further, it has been argued that Turkey might have to reconsider the possibility of abandoning 
one of its commitments1. 
 
Understanding the merits of European integration from the start, Turkey always wanted to 
become a member of the EC/EU. In 1963, Turkey signed an association agreement with the 
EC which set customs union as the final goal. During the 1970’s, Turkey was offered to join 
the EC, which was concerned that Greek membership would create a discrepancy between 
Turkey and Greece. Oddly enough, Turkish officials at the time declined the offer and it was 
not until 1987 when Turkey applied for full membership to the EC but was turned down by 
then. In 1995, Turkey concluded the customs union agreement envisaged in the 1963 
Agreement, and raised its hopes for membership in the EU. At the European Council in 
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Luxembourg in 1997, Turkey was said to be suitable for candidacy, but could not be granted 
candidate status yet because of its lack of democracy and human rights violations. On the 
other hand, even though it did not do much about its deficiencies, Turkey was granted 
candidacy in the Helsinki European Council in 1999. This has been attributed to the EU’s 
worry that it might alienate Turkey and cause it to destabilize, creating a predicament more 
than the EU bargained for2. In order to start accession negotiations, Turkey has instituted a set 
of reforms, the most important of which is the granting of cultural and educational rights to 
those of its citizens whose native language is not Turkish, as well as the abolishment of 
capital punishment. Accordingly, it believes that it deserves to start the accession negotiations 
with the positive response of the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. As a 
matter of fact, the decision the EU takes in December and Turkey’s reaction to that decision is 
going to determine whether the arguments herein are to become future trends or mere 
historical knowledge. 
 
3.1 Origins: Turkey as a Western/European Security Partner During the Cold War 
With its independence in 1923, Turkey followed a neutral foreign policy which can be 
explained in terms of the liberal institutionalist paradigm3. Seeing how war-mongering 
tendencies cost the Ottoman Empire, Turkey formulated a defensive, cooperative and non-
aligned foreign policy. The Kemalist elite always paid attention to opt to peaceful solutions 
for its problems with its neighbors, such as in the case of population exchange with Greece 
and the status of Northern Iraq with Britain. It also signed friendship agreements with the 
Soviet Union despite Atatürk’s loathing for Communism, also with its other neighbors such as 
Greece and Iran. Turkey also joined the League of Nations so as to contribute to world peace. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 Dağı, İhsan. “Kritik Karar: ABD ya da AB”, Radikal, March 12, 2002 
2 Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. 2001. “Turkey’s EU Candidacy: The Role of Security Considerations”, Security 
Dialogue 32 (3):379-383  
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In this respect, Atatürk’s “peace at home, peace in the world” proverb depicts the point 
properly.  
 
On the other hand, things were bound to change for Turkey following the Second World War. 
Turkey did not enter the Second World War until March 1945, and did so in order to comply 
with the United States’ warning that those countries that do not declare war against Germany 
and Japan shall not be allowed to join the United Nations Organization. Correspondingly, 
Turkey joined the UN, desiring to preserve its peaceful conduct of foreign policy to the 
furthest extent possible. Following the war, however, its offer to renew the friendship 
agreement with the USSR in 1946 was struck down by the Soviets. Bearing in mind the wrath 
Germany lay on it, the Soviet Union was in search to have military outposts in countries 
surrounding it so as to keep its enemies at arm’s length. Hence, the Soviets demanded 
territorial concessions from Turkey, as well as bases in the Turkish Straits. At the time, the 
British government was supporting the Greek government against the Communist insurgency 
in Greece, while Britain promised help to the Turkish government as well. On the other hand, 
as the British economy entered a state of recession, the British warned the Americans of their 
withdrawal from their commitments in Southeast Europe. President Harry Truman, through 
the what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, stressed on the obligation for the United 
States “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities 
or by outside pressure.” Under the Truman Doctrine, Turkey received significant quantities of 
supplies and aid from the US and from that point onwards chose the path towards the West in 
its foreign and security policies.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Karaosmanoğlu, Ali L. 2000. “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey”, 
Journal of International Affairs, 54. p.208 
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When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in 1949, Turkey, realizing the 
organization’s importance for its national security, sent troops to the Korean War in return for 
NATO membership. Owing to its involvement in the Korean War, it obtained NATO 
membership with Greece in 1952. Until the end of the Cold War, Turkey conformed with the 
status quo that NATO membership implied, that is to say it did not implement an independent 
foreign policy, except for the case of Cyprus in July 1974. Other than the case of Cyprus, 
Turkey was an integral and loyal partner of the security of the West. Turkey, and along with 
Greece was referred to as the southern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, as it was 
the only NATO ally, along with Norway, to share a direct border with the USSR, and being 
the gatekeepers to one of the Soviet Union’s most important waterways, Turkey’s 
significance for the Alliance was undisputed during the Cold War. 
 
The conclusion of the Cold War did not demonstrate a decline for Turkey’s importance to 
Western security, even though Turkish policy-makers initially feared such a complication. 
Following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Turkey’s eagerness to act in accordance 
with the coalition led by the US showed Turkey’s indispensability as an asset in a volatile 
region. Further on, Turkey’s geographical proximity to new oil resources of the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia added to Turkey’s importance. Also, Turkey’s convergence with 
Israel was welcomed by the United States, as its interests lay with the two of its most 
important allies in the Middle East4. Overall, Turkey continued to act as an important political 
actor in the crossroads of the world’s hot zones in a new era. On the other hand, Turkey’s 
importance was not being read in the same manner by the US and the EU, and Turkey’s 
strategic imperatives were changing as well. While the United States converged with Turkey 
during the 1990’s, this was not necessarily the case for the EU.  
                                                          
4 Makovsky, Alan. “US Policy Toward Turkey: Progress and Problems” in Abramowitz, Morton (ed.) 2000. 
Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy. New York: The Century Foundation Press, p.237 
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3.2 Turkey and the EU in the post-Cold War Era 
As it was stated, towards the end of the Cold War, there were considerations to strengthen the 
European pillar of NATO. Because the strengthening of NATO’s European pillar was carried 
out mainly through the WEU, and as the WEU became an EU body, and above all, as Turkey 
was not encouraged as much as the CEEC’s for EU membership, it appeared that Turkey was 
being excluded from not only the security and defense umbrella of Europe, in spite of its 
commitment to Europe’s security throughout the Cold War, but also from European 
integration in general. The risk of being excluded from EU enlargement after the Cold War 
caused Turkish policy-makers to lose a good deal of sleep over their country’s future 
(Park,2000:315-328), for exclusion meant not only their country’s failure to be accepted as 
Western, but worse, to undermining Turkey’s strategic leverage, leaving the country to its fate 
in the international scene.  
 
As far as the second pillar is concerned, Europe’s priorities in its security agenda after the 
Cold War has been quite different from those of Turkey; Turkey’s feeling of alienation can be 
traced to the rise of different security risks for Turkey after the Cold War, especially PKK 
terrorism and political Islam. This fact has been the primary determiner not only why 
perceptions of security diverged between Europe and Turkey, but also why Turkey was 
excluded from European integration. In the second chapter, it was seen that the EU was 
mostly concerned with troubles that were occurring outside its borders. On the other hand, 
Turkey’s primary security concerns were internally-related. To give a hint, while Turkey’s 
urgency was to curb PKK terrorism, which was carrying out its actions in the name of 
Kurdish independence, Turkey was quite reluctant to grant any recognition to Kurds as a 
distinct entity. As the EU urged Turkey to differentiate between the PKK and the rights of the 
Kurds, and as the EU itself occasionally failed to distinguish between the PKK and the Kurds, 
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there were many odd instances during the 1990’s when the PKK and its sidekick 
organizations were finding refuge in Europe, taking advantage of the loopholes in Europe’s 
liberal medium, claiming that they were the legitimate representatives of Kurdish people. This 
was read in Turkey as the backing of the PKK by the EU countries, in return, EU’s conditions 
for Turkish membership, such as granting Kurds their rights, were viewed to be proxy claims 
for the PKK’s agenda. 
 
3.2.1 New Security Concerns For Turkey 
Turkey, as most other middle powers, has found itself in an international setting more prone 
to conflict and much more predatory than the Cold War era. The Cold War arrangements 
suggested that there was a high level of certainty as to where a given country’s 
security/insecurity lied and for this reason it was easy to assess and predict threats. As 
globalization took pace, a multitude of new threats emerged from different sources and 
Turkey, owing to its always-emphasized geostrategic importance, found itself in the middle of 
a good deal of security threats, some of which are of importance to the EU.  
 
3.2.1.1 The PKK and the Kurdish Identity 
The biggest security threat that challenged Turkey in the last decade is the activities of the 
PKK. The terrorist organization’s activities claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people 
and only saying that can depict the gravity of the situation. Moreover, the PKK wanted 
Turkey’s southeast regions for an independent Kurdish state; having bad memories of loss of 
territory, one of Turkey’s biggest fear resurfaced.  
 
The rise of the PKK had its roots in the past. The usage of Kurdish in the daily life was 
technically barred until the 1980’s and neither was education in Kurdish allowed, until quite 
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recently. In 1984, with overtones of Kurdish nationalism, the essentially Marxist PKK began 
carrying out violent attacks against Turkey in the southeast, especially targeting civilians – 
who themselves were mostly Kurdish - between 1984 and 1999, calling out for the secession 
of Eastern Anatolia. PKK terror came as a major hurdle to the Turkish state because it was 
obvious that something had to be done regarding the cultural and educational rights of the 
Kurds. On the other hand, doing so was also problematic because this would have symbolized 
submission to the PKK’s claims. The problem with the PKK was just that; it was very hard to 
distinguish between the rights of Kurds as citizens and the claims of secessionists. If the 
Kurds were granted those rights, then they might have taken further steps for more rights, 
leading to political autonomy, even independence, this way of thinking ran. 
  
Caught up in that paradox of Kurds as citizens and Kurds as terrorists, Turkey had an 
uncompromising attitude towards either of them, until March 1999 when the conflict was 
finally brought to a rest, if not an end, by the capture of the terrorist organization’s leader 
Abdullah Öcalan. With the decline of the PKK, investments have been gradually shifted to the 
southeast region where the PKK terror had hit hard and was strongest over the years5. More 
importantly, the amendments to the Turkish laws allowed Kurds to practice Kurdish language 
in public, through education and the mass media. 
 
As it was previously pointed out, the one of the greatest rows between the EU and Turkey has 
been over the question of the Kurds and the PKK. The EU has developed the means for 
minorities to practice their differences in religion, linguistics and culture, with its political 
criteria, especially after the Copenhagen criteria. The problem in Turkey is the status of 
minorities; the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, which established Turkey’s place in the 
                                                          
5 This is an important point because the southeast’s poverty was deemed as the main reason why the PKK’s 
activities found root there more easily. 
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international arena, outlined that only non-Muslim people in Turkey, namely Jews, 
Armenians and Greeks, were minorities with rights to practice their language and religion. As 
the Kurds are Muslims, they were accepted as Turks and were not granted the rights that non-
Muslims enjoyed. This point was also a crucial aspect of the deadlock over the PKK and the 
Kurdish identity. 
 
Moreover, the southeast, where the Kurds are densely populated, was traditionally very poor. 
As the Turkish state failed to provide for the economic well-being of its citizens here, its 
ideological telos to create a new Turkish citizen did not find audience among the Kurds. Thus, 
unable to assimilate Kurds to mainstream Turkish society, the PKK had a suitable breeding 
ground. The EU urged Turkey to approach the Kurdish question while isolating it from the 
PKK terror. Seeing how this can serve its purposes, the PKK setup proxy associations in 
Europe under the disguise of solidarity with the Kurds, so as to promote its agenda in Europe. 
The EU, just like Turkey, was not able to differentiate the identity claims of Kurds from the 
PKK’s propaganda, and thus continuously quarreled with Turkey over the issue. The decline 
of the PKK terror eased the tensions between Turkey and the EU in the last few years. 
 
3.2.1.2 Political Islam 
Together with the loss of territory, Turkey has mostly feared the possibility of the upset of its 
secular political system, built on the principles of Atatürk. Turkey’s drive to the West has 
been brought about by the separation of the state from religious matters and this Turks, as an 
overwhelmingly Muslim society, find great pride in. As a matter of fact, it was the secular 
political system that enabled Turkey to seek membership in the EU and the West. On the 
other hand, there has been many tensions over the question of secularism in Turkey. For 
example, in order to consolidate Western way of life in the daily affairs of ordinary people, a 
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mandatory dress code was passed in the 1930’s, banning all clothes that were not Western. To 
exemplify further, Islamic law was completely abolished, in exchange for adapting the 
Western legal system. While this pattern of behavior did consolidate the secular system in 
Turkey, it also created a good deal of opposition among those who were unhappy with the 
decline of the role of Islam in the country. Thus, political Islam started to emerge in the 
1970’s with its appeal to the deficiencies of the secular system in Turkey, claiming that it was 
an imitation of the West and was disrespectful to people’s choices.  
 
Even though many Turks are Muslims, they strike a balance between their faith and the 
modern world. Many are comfortable with Turkey’s secularism and see it as a guarantee of 
their country’s contentment. With the rise of identity politics in Turkey in the post-Cold War 
era and globalization, and also owing to the mass poverty, political Islam found a firm 
audience. After the elections of December 1995, the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan 
came to power. Hoping to steer the country to his way of thinking, Erbakan opened a debate 
as to the need to revise the secular system. He supported anti-secular sentiment through 
various means, such as the hosting of fundamentalist leaders in the Prime Ministerial 
residence, which he seldom used, as well as allowing one of his district mayors to hold an 
anti-Israeli show where the Iranian ambassador called on the audience not to fear being 
labeled as fundamentalists6. Nevertheless, Erbakan’s move created a great deal of resentment 
from the Turkish military, which has traditionally acted in the name of guarding the secular 
republic. To this end, Erbakan was forced to resign by the military in June 1997, and the 
Constitutional Court closed down his Welfare Party, as well as its successor the Virtue Party. 
Erbakan is banned from politics for a 5-year term. 
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The threat that political Islam poses to Turkey is significant, although it does so more 
symbolically. To compare it with the PKK, political Islam does not have access to the means 
of coercion that the PKK does. Moreover, it does not receive the foreign support in scope that 
the PKK enjoys. On the other hand, it does have a strong social base in many parts of Turkey, 
particularly from the urban poor, those fed up from the secular officials’ ineptitude, and of 
course, religious devotees. As its project requires less coercion, political Islam does not 
threaten the lives of Turkish people, but their system of government. What political Islam 
aims is the secular essence of the Republic of Turkey, and for that reason Turkish policy-
makers have reserved the first place for political Islam on their list of priority of threats7.  
 
3.2.1.3 The Middle East 
Turkey is in the vicinity of one of the hottest spots of the international realm. It neighbors 
countries such as Syria, Iraq and Iran, with which it did not enjoy very friendly relations in 
the past. Even though Syria has begun moving to the globalizing world with the death of 
Hafez al-Asad in June 2000 and established good relations with Turkey since then, it was an 
staunch supporter of the PKK throughout the 1990’s. In this respect, Turkey did warn its 
southern neighbor on the repercussions of that support and came to the verge of war in 1998. 
However, this is no longer the case and Syria is converging with Turkey, especially trade-
wise and it is unlikely that tension will mount to the extent that it did during the 1990’s. As 
with Iran and Iraq, Turkey seeks to establish mutually beneficial relations with these two 
countries but it has a significant ideological divide with Iran as this country stands 
diametrically opposite to Turkey because of its Islamic regime and there is displeasure onthe 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6 This is the better renowned “Sincan incident” of autumn 1996, which the military responded by sending tanks 
to the district, however dodging doubts by saying that it was a misunderstanding and that the tanks had lost their 
way during exercise. 
7 The National Security Council’s National Security Policy Document (Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi) allegedly 
claims separatist and reactionary actions as equally dangerous to Turkey’s national security. The Document is 
claimed to be obtained by the daily newspaper Hürriyet, available in Turkish at:   
http://arama. hurriyetim.com.tr/devam.asp?id=8986   
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part of Turkish policy-makers towards the Iraqi regime over its uncompromising attitude in 
Middle East affairs. Iraq is also problematic for Turkey because of the authority gap created 
in Northern Iraq following the Gulf War. Kurdish factions are creating a political space there, 
much to Turkey’s bitter reaction as it is concerned with a similar tendency in its own Kurdish 
population.  
 
Moreover, the Middle East hosts an additional security risk for Turkey, especially due to the 
Palestinian question and in this manner, Turkey’s improving relations with Israel. Turkey 
signed a set of agreements with Israel in the 1990’s, most of which are in the field of military 
cooperation, in order to secure a stable source of weapons as Europe was reluctant to sell 
Turkey claiming that it was using it against the civilians in the southeast. In addition, Turkey 
wishes to upgrade its military technology through its cooperation with Israel, which is quite 
advanced in that respect. However, Turkey’s convergence with Israel has caused it to be 
perceived as Israel’s ally by those Middle Eastern countries that are hostile to Israel, 
complicating Turkey’s situation. The problem in this respect is to what degree can Turkey’s 
convergence with Israel be kept at an optimum level so as not to attract Arab countries’ 
resentment. To that objective, Turkey uses the Israeli card wisely, continuously reiterating 
that its cooperation with Israel is just that – cooperation -  and that it does not aim at any third 
party, while benefiting from the merits of its cooperation with Israel. 
 
3.2.1.4 Organized Crime  
The fourth threat to Turkey’s security is its increasing importance for organized crime 
networks. As far as human, narcotics, and arms smuggling is concerned, Turkey has become a 
gateway and a transit route for those transactions. The increase in these activities in Turkey 
owes to Turkey’s geographical proximity to the locations of the supply of and the demand for 
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these “commodities”. The question of organized crime also has implications for the PKK 
problem. In order to finance its operations, the PKK has traditionally been active in narcotics 
and human trafficking8. Thus, organized crime also benefits the PKK, which has been a 
significant danger to Turkey’s security. Moreover, Turkey’s promising economic future might 
turn the country into a final destination, not only a transit route for organized crime networks 
thus degrading Turkey’s security. As it was argued in the last chapter, the danger with 
organized crime is that it might eventually establish itself in those countries where it operates, 
undermining state authority and this risk is also true for the Turkish state. 
 
3.2.1.5 Other Hot Spots: The Caucasus and the Balkans 
Turkey is in the vicinity of two other unstable regions that suffer from ethnic strife; the 
Balkans and the Caucasus. Not only are these regions near by, but Turkey has a significant 
number of its citizens who have origins from these two regions. Especially the Turkish 
citizens of Caucasian origin still identify themselves with their ethnic origin and display great 
concern with the problems of that region. The Balkans and the Caucasus are also important 
not because parts of the Turkish population originate from these places, but because they are 
very inflammable. It was constantly feared during the Balkan conflicts (Bosnia-Kosovo-
Macedonia) throughout the 1990’s that the fighting in those hot spots might spread to Greece 
and Turkey due to the latter two countries’ interests with the peoples of former Yugoslavia.  
 
As with the Caucasus, Turkey is not sharing a land border with Russia for the first time for 
nearly four centuries and for this reason is more than happy to keep Georgia and Azerbaijan 
out of the Russian sphere of influence. Similar to the Balkans, any trouble here might easily 
escalate into a serious conflict that might confront Turkey and Russia. Hence, Turkey 
                                                          
8 Yılmaz, Halil. 1998. “Türkiye’de Organize Suç”, Turkish Journal of Police Studies, 1(1):73-85 
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endeavors to preserve peace and order, along with the territorial integrity of Georgia and 
Azerbaijan9. 
 
3.2.2 Turkish Security Trends in the Face of New Concerns 
What can first be said about the basic trends in Turkey’s foreign and security policy in the last 
decade is the increasing reliance on its own capabilities. It can be said that even though 
Turkey has not given up on its relations with the European Union and NATO in exchange for 
non-alignment or some such, Turkey has sought to address its security concerns by its own 
means. Thus, Turkey tries to go its own way to the greatest length possible in the realm of 
security and foreign affairs. After all, relations with the EU have been of a political and 
mostly economic nature rather than on security matters and the two parties have been 
quarreling over the question of the PKK and the Kurds. As with the importance of the United 
States for Turkey’s security concerns, Turkey has put stock in its alliance with the US. 
However, since the Soviet threat is no more, American military support has lost its 
importance for the Turkish military buildup as American military aid does not come as grants 
or donations anymore - Turkey has started to pay for what it gets from the United States.  
 
The above-mentioned new threats have forced Turkey to adapt new understandings of serving 
its security needs. To enhance this point, it will be prudent to look at how Turkish security 
policies operated in certain circumstances. In October 1998, General Atilla Ateş, then 
commander of the army, made a speech condemning Syria for its support of the PKK with a 
very hostile tone and warned that Turkey is fed up with Syria because of that. This action 
came to the surprise of Turkey’s NATO allies. Indeed, the United States, which was not a 
great source of support (but neither a great opposition like the EU) in Turkey’s fight against 
                                                          
9 Karaosmanoğlu, Ali. L. 2001 “Turkey’s Objectives in the Caspian Region” in Gennady Chufrin (ed.) The 
Security of the Caspian Region, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp:151-165 
 92
the PKK but did not expect Turkey’s move against Syria either. It was a milestone in Turkey's 
conduct of its foreign and security policy and a rare incident in its Republican history that 
Turkey threatened one of its neighbors with military action. Nevertheless, it can be relied as a 
reference point in the following years when and if Turkey faces a similar predicament to that 
caused by the PKK terror. 
 
On the other side of the equation, Turkey’s resort to independent measures is by no means an 
always-preferred method in the realm of security. Turkey has always advocated the notion of 
collective security for NATO members and former Soviet republics and satellites and was 
keen on upgrading security ties with states that were related to its security sensitivities. In 
addition, Turkey was in great support of NATO enlargement10, and as a matter of fact, 
advocated an even more encompassing enlargement to non-members, such as Romania and 
Bulgaria. The argument here runs that by including some countries into NATO and leaving 
others out, enlargement fails to provide for the security it promises to Eastern Europe; 
moreover, it brings about new insecurities and unease between the new members and non-
members. Thus, Turkey advocated a NATO enlargement that was greater in scope than the 
one in 1999 and this is sufficient evidence that it is still an adherent to the Atlantic Alliance. 
 
3.2.3 Divergence and Convergence Between Turkey and the EU in the Second Pillar 
Turkey-EU relations, in the scope of the second pillar, are paralyzed with problems, 
especially due to the suspicions towards Europe on the part of Turkey. On the other hand, 
should one assess the opportunities that lay, there is also great hope and benefit for the two 
parties to cooperate, especially in the field of security. The hindrances to Turkey’s 
                                                          
10 Karaosmanoğlu, Ali L. 1999. “NATO Enlargement and the South: A Turkish Perspective”, Security Dialogue 
30 (2): 213-224 
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convergence with Europe, particularly those related to the realm of security shall be looked at. 
Then, the prospects of a cooperation amongst the two parties in the future will be assessed. 
 
3.2.3.1 Obstacles For Turkey’s Inclusion Into the Second Pillar 
3.2.3.1a Greece 
The Ottoman Empire ruled Greece for well over 300 years and only through a violent national 
uprising were the Greeks able to regain independence in the early 19th century. For this 
reason, many Greeks-even the most moderate ones-bear a certain level of xenophobia towards 
Turks. Conversely, many Turks, recalling their bitter experiences of their War of 
Independence when a large part of Western Anatolia was invaded by Greece and then again 
only through a very hard struggle were they able to regain independence in 1923. With this in 
the backs of their minds, many Turks are not Greekophiles either. 
 
The biggest problem between Greece and Turkey is the status of the Aegean Sea. Even 
though the problem has subcategories, it is laden with historical rivalry as well. Until fairly 
recently, much of the islands of the Aegean belonged to the Ottoman Empire but was 
relegated to Italy and partly Greece during its decline. In a few years after the conclusion of 
the Second World War, Italy, having acquired all major Aegean islands during the war, 
transferred all the Aegean islands as well as the Dodacanese islands, off Turkey’s southwest 
coast to Greece.  
 
With the foundation of the republic in Turkey and the promotion of the “peace at home, peace 
in the world” principle, Turkey has laid down any claims to the Greek islands in the Aegean 
Sea. On the other hand, much of public opinion in Turkey look upon the loss of these islands 
to Greece with bitter and when there arises a serious dispute between Turkey and Greece, they 
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look upon these islands as a potential asset. As far as Turkish policy-makers are concerned, 
however, the invasion of these islands is not an option unless in an engagement in full scale 
war with Greece11. 
 
Other than the historic and symbolic meaning of the Aegean, there lies a much more serious 
factor that makes the Aegean question relevant. As the sea is full of islands of different scale 
and size, and as almost all of them belong to Greece, Greece controls important passage 
routes in the Aegean. With the current status of the waterways of the Aegean, a given ship 
which is en route to the Western Mediterranean has to make its way from the international 
waterways that are quite ambivalent. Even though Greece has not yet implemented the 12-
mile provision of the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea), the current 
6-mile status secures an eminent leverage for Greece vis-à-vis Turkey. One problem is that 
Greece claims that it reserves the right to extend its territorial waters to the 12-mile provision, 
thus virtually making a Greek lake of the Aegean. Turkey views such an action as a direct 
threat against its national interests and intimidates Greece with war, paralyzing Turkey’s 
relations with its EU-member neighbor12. 
 
Another problem with the islands of the Aegean is about the continental shelves, which is the 
more figurative rather than essential question related to the territorial waters. The basic 
problem between the two parties when questioning the status of the continental shelves is that 
the Greek side claims that the sea bed around their islands constitute a continental shelf while 
Turkey puts the argument that the legitimate continental shelf extends from the Anatolian 
mainland. What makes these continental shelves important is ironic - both parties believe that 
there are significant oil and natural gas resources beneath the Aegean and for this reason 
                                                          
11 This point is still believed to be preserved in the National Security Policy Document. Please see point 7. 
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endeavor to have the most of that. Ironically, while such rumors have been dragging on for 
over a quarter of a century, and despite all the research conducted, there has not been a major 
discovery of any reserve of any natural resource beneath the Aegean Sea.  
 
Another problem with the Aegean Sea is the Flight Information Region (FIR). Greece 
unilaterally declared that its airspace is 10 miles from its islands in the Aegean. On the other 
hand, international law sets a country’s airspace to the limit of its territorial waters. Thus, no 
party that uses the Aegean take Greece’s claims over the FIR seriously. On the other hand, 
because of the row over the FIR, Turkey and Greece are in a constant scruffle, not attaining 
much. 
 
As far as the Greek-Turkish dispute is concerned, the question of the Aegean Sea poses a 
significant predicament to both sides and their rapprochement is hindered with the many 
strings attached to the problem. Turkey is already disadvantaged in its access to the 
waterways while Greece enjoys greater control over significant portions of the Aegean. As 
with Greece, it is under the constant threat of war upon its possible implementation of an 
international legal regime by its much stronger adversary. Henceforth, it has used this 
presence of threat against Turkey in the EU circles, by freezing credits to Turkey and 
blocking Turkey’s assembling with the EU. Thus, it is imperative for Turkey to reach an 
understanding with Greece if it wishes to converge with the EU. 
 
3.2.3.1b Cyprus 
Another problematic dimension of the relations between the EU and Turkey is the Cyprus 
question. The contemporary history of the island starts with the London and Zurich 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
12 Wilkinson, James M. “The United States, Turkey and Greece: Three’s a Crowd”, in Morton Abramowitz (ed.) 
2000. Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy. New York: The Century Foundation Press, pp:185-218 
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agreements of 1959 and 1960. With the end of British rule in 1960, the binational Republic of 
Cyprus was founded with a constitution that enabled the Turkish community to hold 
important posts reserved for them, the highest of them being the office of Vice-President of 
the Republic. Also, Cyprus was barred from union with another country, and that important 
agenda were only to be carried out with the consensus of the two communities. In 1963, with 
the boast of ungovernability, the Greek community unilaterally annulled the constitution by 
driving Turks out of the offices which they held. For the next decade, the social, economic, 
and political circumstances for Turkish Cypriots worsened. With the coup against President 
Makarios by a group of ultra-right wing Greek militants, backed up the military junta in 
power in Greece in July 1974, Turkey, acting accordingly with its status of guarantor of the 
London Agreement and the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, unilaterally intervened in 
the island.  
 
From 1974 onwards not much has changed for the two communities of the island regarding 
the political status quo; the island remains divided with thick lines. One problem for the 
Turks, however is that, as their stateness is not accepted by the international community and 
are under a whole-scale embargo, they are greatly impoverished compared to their Greek 
counterparts. Their state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is seen as illegitimate, and 
with the exception of Turkey, no country on the world recognizes this state. 
 
Cyprus is important to Turkey for fairly obvious reasons. First, the island is 40 nautical miles 
off Turkey’s southern shores. In addition to protecting the Turkish community, there was the 
risk of having substantial Greek military presence in Cyprus, putting southern portions of 
Turkey under threat. In that sense, it is not the economic opportunities that Cyprus presents to 
Turkey, but its geographic proximity. It has been argued that Cyprus is important for Turkey 
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in a different fashion. The argument is that in the wake of a war between Turkey and Greece, 
as the latter has developed repulsive measures on and around its Aegean and Dodacanese 
islands, Turkey maintains a preponderance of power to its advantage in Cyprus to serve its 
own ends13. In other words, Cyprus is seen as a potential pawn. A victory in Cyprus, which 
would secure the mentioned parts of Turkey, will compensate a possible failure in the 
Aegean. This was the reason why Turkey strongly objected to the installation of the S-300 
missile batteries to the island in 1995. 
 
Even though Greece does not claim to have a say over the Cyprus question (as the Republic 
of Cyprus is a sovereign nation), looking at the alternative argument from the other side of 
heaven will lead to a clear result: Greece can use and indeed has used the Cypriot card against 
Turkey to force the latter to continue to spend its valuable military assets for the island. 
Above that, Greece established its own military presence on the island, through the 
installation of a number of air bases under the Joint Defense Doctrine signed between Greece 
and Greek Cyprus in November 1993, creating more breathing space for Greece in its 
conflictual relation with Turkey. 
 
The question of Cyprus is important for the EU in a variety of reasons. In the first place, it is 
on the tip of the Middle East, enabling it to have closer proximity with the region. More 
importantly, Greek Cyprus is an EU candidate and is on the verge of becoming an EU 
member. The relevance of the island for the EU and its second pillar, similar to those of 
Greece, is that instability here would read as unrest for the EU. Accordingly, EU countries 
would be unwilling to accept a Turkey that has significant security problems with its actual 
and potential members. 
 
                                                          
13 Kibaroğlu, Mustafa. “Kıbrıs’ın Stratejik Önemi Nerede?”. Milliyet, August 29, 2000.  
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If all of that is so, why has not been the question of Cyprus solved? Until 1983, the political 
structure in Northern Cyprus, under the control of the Turks, was labeled as the Federated 
Turkish State of Cyprus, suggesting a federation in the island. On the other hand, negotiations 
between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots came to no acceptable conclusion and 
with that, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. One 
problem that this political entity faces, and one that constitutes the core of the Cypriot 
dilemma today, is the non-recognition of the TRNC by the international. The creation of the 
TRNC was not due to the deliberate actions of the Turkish Cypriot community leader Rauf 
Denktaş, but through the overwhelming majority of Turkish Cypriots in the referendum of 
1983. On the other hand, the international community, in line with the UN resolutions, 
recognizes the Greek Cypriot part of Cyprus as the sole representative of the now factually 
defunct Republic of Cyprus. Hence, the current deadlock is that Turkish Cypriots and Turkey 
wishes TRNC to be recognized as a political entity, which the EU refuses to do. Moreover, 
Turkey’s EU membership is seemingly made conditional to a solution in Cyprus; as long as 
the Cyprus cleavage remains, it will be doubtful to what extent Turkey can come to better 
terms with the EU and Greece.   
 
3.2.3.1c The Scope, Decision-making and Deficiencies of the CFSP 
The creation of an independent ESDP and CFSP from NATO has been met with constant 
opposition from Turkey. For one thing, Turkey opposed the idea of decoupling NATO’s 
strength. Second, as the ESDP was being formulated predominantly through the EU’s CFSP, 
Turkey was concerned that it will be kept out of the decision-making process, since it was not 
an EU member. Because of that, Turkey constantly opposed the WEU’s integration and 
eventual assimilation into the EU. 
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In that respect, due to the sheer size of its armed forces and its possible contribution to the 
CFSP through the Rapid Reaction Force, Turkey would definitely seek to have an important 
say in the command of the RRF and the CFSP. This relates to one of the hypothesis why the 
EU is skeptical towards Turkish membership. Upon accession, Turkey will have the greatest 
population in the EU, second to Germany, overturning all decision-making structures within 
the Council and the Parliament. In parallel, it is also questionable whether the UK, Germany, 
Italy and France would like to see a Turkey having equal say in the matters of the second 
pillar. It will be very hard for the EU to accept Turkey to that breadth. 
 
There has been concerns, until very recently, about the scope of operations of the CFSP and 
its utilization of NATO capabilities. Because Turkey’s accession to the EU is yet blur, the 
greatest concern is whether the RRF in particular and EU’s CFSP in general will challenge 
Turkey in favor of Greece. In parallel, it is also a matter of concern that Turkey would be 
excluded from the decision-making structure when the RRF would operate in places such as 
the Caucasus, the Middle East, or even Cyprus, without consulting with Turkey. In this 
respect, Turkey demonstrated its veto power and grief in NATO, aiming to hinder the 
development of the RRF of which it was not allowed to partake. Nonetheless, the Bosnia and 
Kosovo crises have depicted the need for EU countries to pursue NATO capabilities in the 
generative stages of the RRF. Thus, with the conclusion of negotiations in Ankara in 
December 2001 between the US, the UK, and Turkey, the latter has guaranteed that it will not 
hinder the usage of NATO capabilities for the second pillar’s development in exchange for 
the promise that the RRF will not be used against a NATO member and that Turkey will also 
be included to the decision-making body through an informal “intensive consultation process” 
if the RRF is to carry an operation in Turkey’s geographic proximity.  
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In a broader approach, the problem for Turkey and the second pillar is the latter’s yet inability 
to deliver the promises that NATO at the moment delivers. Turkey is backed up by the Article 
5 of the Washington Treaty and in this respect, only NATO, particularly the United States, 
has the means to support Turkey in case of aggression with one or more of its southeastern 
and eastern neighbors, namely Iran, Iraq and Syria. Contrary to the Johnson Letter experience 
of 1963, the United States issued warnings to Syria throughout the 1990’s when its relations 
with Turkey tensed sporadically. Physically speaking, it would be doubtful whether the RRF, 
even with the pooling of Turkey’s capabilities, would still be incompetent in serving Turkey’s 
security needs. Moreover, Turkey’s security concerns, even though showing resemblance 
with those of the EU, are diverse from the EU point of view. Thus, there would have to be a 
rather odd arrangement where a country that is a part of the second pillar still continuing to 
rely heavily on American assistance. It would not appear fashionably for the European 
security makeup, but one has to understand that Turkey’s concerns are not ill-founded. The 
current plan for the European RRF is that it will primarily serve as a peace-keeping, and 
peace-making force, under the Petersberg tasks. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the Petersberg tasks 
were not successfully carried out until the US moved in. Indeed, the US military had to be 
deployed in order to re-establish peace and order in the Balkans, displaying the deficiencies of 
the second pillar. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable to doubt to what extent Turkey can rely on 
the second pillar even if a humanitarian crisis emerge in its vicinity. 
 
3.2.3.1d Turkey’s Dangerous Liaisons: The Middle East 
As it was stated, Turkey found itself in the middle of a good deal of very real security threats. 
The Middle East is the one of the prime loci of those threats. This concerns the EU to a great 
extent; the Europeans may not wish to extend their borders to the Middle East due to the 
unpredictable nature of the region. It will be very hard for the EU to extend its security 
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commitments to Turkey through the CFSP, which envisages the creation of a common 
European defense policy as well. 
 
On the other hand, as the Gulf War displayed, there is no escape for Europe from the 
problems of the Middle East. Indeed, it might conversely be argued that it will be more 
prudent for the EU to have access to the Middle East, most reasonably over Turkey. 
Moreover, Turkey’s attitudes over the Middle East has been much more compatible with that 
of the EU than the US, meaning that Turkey has adhered to diplomatic solutions much more 
than the US, and for this reason there is more wisdom for Europe to converge with Turkey in 
the realm of the second pillar, especially if the Middle East is in question. 
  
On the other hand, there might be prudence for the EU to cautiously consider Turkey’s 
involvement in the Middle East. In October 1998, General Atilla Ateş, commander of the 
army, made a speech right at the Syrian border, condemning Syria for its support of the PKK 
with a very vulgar and hostile tone and warned that “Turkey is running low on its patience”14. 
For a while it was expected that Turkey was really going to hit Syria this time, as the need for 
Turkey’s patience was scrutinized in various circles in Turkey. In this respect, the crisis with 
Syria over the PKK depicted that Turkey is getting rid of its inertial and reactive approach to 
its security threats in exchange with a much more proactive approach. Preferable as it may be 
to Turkish policy-makers, it will be doubtful how much the EU would wish to have a Turkey 
that so explicitly threatens its adversary when its stakes are in danger. The EU might be 
bogged down in a conflict which it is not even remotely related to. Hence, there is also a 
setback factor, in the light of this case, to Turkey’s convergence with the EU in the realm of 
the second pillar. 
                                                          
14 http://www.radikal.com.tr/1998/10/02/dis/01sur.html  
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3.2.3.2 Contributors For Turkey’s Inclusion Into the Second Pillar: 
3.2.3.2a Turkey’s Geostrategic Importance 
The paramount positive consequence of Turkey’s inclusion in the second pillar lies in 
Turkey’s geostrategic importance. Turkey lies at a bridgehead which links the Eurasian land 
mass to the Middle East, and Europe to the Caucasus. Thus, Turkey’s chances for 
convergence with the EU increases when its geostrategic importance is borne in mind. A good 
deal of the areas that might require the RRF’s deployment are very close to Turkey; the 
Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and even Central Asia. To exemplify, during the war 
in Afghanistan in the past one year, many Western troops were airlifted from Europe to 
Afghanistan through and from Turkey. For this reason it is perfectly reasonable to argue that 
Turkey would be a good addition to the CFSP considering its logistical importance. 
 
More important than the deployment of the RRF, Turkey’s geostrategic importance for the 
EU has several other meanings. First, Turkey is very close to the oilfields of the Middle East 
and the South Caucasus. It is the oil that comes from here that has, and will continue to, 
constitute a good deal of the EU’s energy needs. Moreover, a good deal of the Caucasus and 
Middle East oil passes, or is going to pass from Turkey, for consumption in the West. 
Moreover, the oil pipeline projects that will be carrying Central Asian oil and natural gas to 
Europe will be passing from Turkey. Hence, it is quite important for the EU to have a secure 
source of energy. In this respect, Turkey’s role as a secure route for energy supplies As the 
EU is severely dependent on oil, the safety of the passageways of oil is of utmost importance 
for the EU. Thus, convergence with Turkey in that respect would be a wise move on the part 
of the EU.  
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3.2.3.2b Turkey as a Military/Security Power 
Turkey’s inclusion into the second pillar will significantly determine the success of the CFSP 
and the RRF in the near future due to Turkey’s military strength as it has the sixth largest 
standing army in the world15. In this sense, Turkey’s large military can present itself as a 
source of well-trained and disciplined combat forces. Moreover, Turkey has gained a good 
deal of combat experience, owing to its fight against the PKK. For that reason, including 
Turkey to the CFSP would be very helpful when carrying out the types of low-density 
counter-terrorist operations which the Turkish military is experienced; just the types of 
operation which are part of the CFSP’s Petersberg tasks.  
 
As it was stated before, Turkey lies as a transit route for organized crime transactions, also to 
the harm of the EU. Illegal drugs from various Middle Eastern nations, as well as those from 
countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, have used Turkey as a feasible transit route to 
access markets in the EU, deteriorating the social fabric of its societies. Similar findings may 
be applied to illegal migration, which not only causes social problems such as racial tension, 
but also creates a window of opportunity for organized crime networks, which make 
enormous profits from human trafficking16. However, in the recent years, the persistent 
struggle especially against narcotics smuggling has seriously curtailed Turkey’s status as a 
transit route17. As a matter of fact, this can be said to hinder the spread of illegal narcotics in 
the EU and for this reason there is wisdom to cooperate in this field from which the EU is also 
under risk. 
 
 
                                                          
15 Hagelin, Björn, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman. 2000. “Transfer of Major Conventional 
Weapons”, SIPRI Yearbook 2000, Oxford: OUP, Appendix 7A, p.368 
16 Yılmaz, Halil. 1998. “Türkiye’de Organize Suç”, Turkish Journal of Police Studies, 1(1):73-85 
17 ibid. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
Some deductions can safely be made looking at the picture depicted which sought to explain 
the meaning of including Turkey in the EU’s second pillar picture. In the first place, Turkey 
definitely continues to bear its importance as a necessary security partner for the European 
countries. Its geostrategic importance cannot be refuted. Turkey is very close to the oil 
resources required for the proper functioning of the world economy. Moreover, it has the 
largest armed forces on the Eurasian continent, second to Russia, hence, including it to the 
second pillar would help a great deal to the construction of the second pillar’s defense aspect 
in the near future.  
 
How can Turkey benefit from integrating with the EU in the realm of the second pillar? In the 
first place, Turkey still commits 4% of its GDP to defense spending18 and a good deal of this 
is allocated to the possibility of a conflict in Cyprus and the Aegean. In the light of this fact, if 
Turkey converges with the EU and Greece, a reconciliation with Greece will ease the pressure 
which the defense spending puts on Turkey’s back, enabling it to provide for its ongoing 
modernization projects. In an optimistic way, Turkey can stabilize its hostile status with 
Greece and Greek Cypriots in the process of converging with the EU; the rationale that 
applied to Germany and France fifty years ago can certainly apply to Turkey, Greece and 
Greek Cypriots. It was that rationale of cooperation that came to such an extent that resulted 
in the EU today. 
 
On the other hand, Turkey still does not know exactly what it wants from the EU, and vice 
versa. For Turkey, economic benefits the EU promises to deliver-which makes Turkey drool-
come about with the withering away of its sovereignty, something which Turkey is still slow 
in grasping. Turkey will lose its dogmatic approach not only to its external affairs but also to 
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its internal ones. This will create tension, as it indeed has in the past, between the EU and 
Turkey over the extent to which the EU can step in Turkey’s “internal” affairs: Turkish 
perception of the “internal” is not so much the internal within the EU anymore and this 
Turkey has yet to comprehend. Conversely, the EU knows that it cannot ignore the presence 
of a country as colossal as Turkey. Such an act will most dangerously force Turkey to turn to 
more self-centered policies that will not benefit both parties in the final analysis. 
 
Will Turkey become an EU member, and how does the second pillar affect this? The answer 
to these questions cannot be given straightforwardly; there are different factors involved. One 
answer depends when the two parties shall clarify their expectations from one another. The 
EU has to assess properly the burden to exclude Turkey. It has to make sure to what extent it 
wishes to see Turkey in Europe. Conversely, Turkey is to decide how much it wants to 
become a part of Europe and adapt to the rules of the game of European integration. If this 
chapter is asked to opine, there is more reason for convergence than divergence between the 
two sides. The problems between Turkey and Greece are not irreconcilable. Moreover, 
Turkey can be a reliable member to implement EU policy in its adjacent regions. On the other 
hand, the fate of these considerations, as it was stated at the beginning of the chapter, lies on 
the outcome of the Copenhagen European Council, coming up in December 2002.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
18 NATO Review, Spring/Summer 2000. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis aimed to depict how European integration has transformed from being a mere 
customs union agreement to a political entity with a common foreign and security policy 
among its members. It has been argued that the European nation-states are in a decline and 
that they have given up their sovereignty in their most crucial realms, such as taxation, 
monetary currency, trade, and now security policy. The thesis paid special importance to the 
security policy bit, as it was argued that this constitutes the peak of integration among the 
different states of Europe. 
 
The origins of the European Union were sought in the first chapter. In theoretical terms, 
several centers of gravity relevant to European integration have been depicted; the 
supranational-intergovernmental divide, the spillover effect, and the question of political 
entity, i.e. federalism and confederalism. Next, the history of the European Union was 
presented to the reader and how this has related to the creation of the Union from the 
Community. The spillover reasoning was especially important; integration progressed as 
success was attained in one field, say customs union, then moved on to economic integration. 
From economic integration came the single market which led to the monetary union, 
abolishing the national currencies (with the exception of the persistent ones) and completing 
the single market. Seeing the single market within reach, political dialogue was extended to 
political cooperation, which is now moving towards the creation of a common foreign and 
security policy, which in time might lead to common defense policy. The Union did not 
transform as it did overnight, but gradually and with much effort and failure. Only when there 
was saturation in one field of cooperation was there a sustainable motion towards deepening 
integration. Even though many scholars are still skeptical towards European integration and 
the European Union, and even though admittedly the EU’s direction cannot be comprehended 
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accurately, the EU has definitely passed the point of no return and can only move forward. 
The EU members are too much intertwined for them to disintegrate. The merits of the 
competitive market, prosperity and peace are all too good to abandon; spillback is quite 
unlikely. To that avail, the EU has endeavored to establish a common foreign and security 
policy to protect those benefits of cooperation from external threats. 
 
In the second chapter, the EU’s CFSP, or second pillar was explained. Its origins was traced 
to the Cold War. European integration was desired by the Americans and to aid the 
Europeans, they committed to defending the continent from the Soviets. Nevertheless, as they 
gained strength and momentum from integration, Europeans themselves began to seek an 
independent foreign policy from the US, and this was argued to constitute the basis of the 
CFSP. With the conclusion of the Cold War, the problem posed by the Soviets was gone, but 
new security risks challenged the EU. Accordingly, the EU formulated new security policies 
and institutions in order to address these risks. In the new era, the EU is moving closer to 
attaining a security identity for itself, increasing its magnitude in the international arena. On 
the other hand, it was argued that this may create some form of division between the US and 
the EU, even though they both uphold the same principles in world affairs. 
 
The raison d’être of the third chapter is rather different. It aims to depict the question of 
including Turkey to the EU’s second pillar. Turkey is a country largely ignored when 
considering European integration. On the other hand, Turkey was an important NATO ally 
throughout the Cold War and its importance to Europe’s security interests is still relevant. 
Thus, in order to assess to what extent Turkey can have a meaning for the EU’s second pillar, 
Turkish security concerns and capabilities were displayed. Moreover, there are also reasons 
for the two parties to diverge when considering their security priorities and the rows between 
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them, especially Greece and Cyprus. On the other hand, it is suggested that these divides are 
not impassable; it should be borne in mind that European integration was initiated with the 
convergence of France and Germany quite shortly after the Second World War. In this sense, 
the chapter tried to depict that there is more reason for the EU and Turkey to converge in the 
realm of the second pillar. 
 
What can be said for the future is that when outlining the security threats for the concerned 
parties of the CFSP, mainly the EU, Russia, the US and Turkey, the risks are more or less the 
same for the parties involved. Hence, it will be prudent for them to forge more cooperative 
patterns of action when addressing their security concerns. The US would not like to drift 
apart from the EU as it is a valuable trading partner and any security threat to Europe will 
inevitably affect the US. The same can be said of Russia, if it continues to move forward with 
democratization and Westernization. As with Turkey, it would like to become an EU member 
as it looks upon the Union as a direction of its Kemalist legacy. The EU’s answer to Turkey 
will determine the future of the relations between the EU and Turkey and possibly the motion 
of the second pillar. 
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